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INTRODUCTION 
n 1933, Senator Burton Wheeler issued the following ap-
peal: “For the captains of industry to be drawing down 
large salaries is unconscionable and unpatriotic . . . . The prac-
tice must be curbed by legislation, through taxation and public-
ity.”1 In the years since his plea, Wheeler’s refrain has been 
echoed countless times by academics, the press, and politi-
cians.2 Lately, even some wealthy investors are losing their pa-
tience: Warren Buffet, the CEO of Berkshire Hathaway, has 
repeatedly argued for change, noting that “[t]oo often, executive 
compensation in the U.S. is ridiculously out of line with per-
formance.”3 President Obama joined the fray in 2009, calling 
the bonuses Wall Street announced in January of that year 
                                                                                                             
 1. Thomas F. Cooley, The Pay Czar’s Dilemma, FORBES.COM (Aug. 19, 
2009, 12:01 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/08/18/andrew-hall-executive-
pay-citigroup-opinions-columnists-thomas-cooley.html. 
 2. See, e.g., id. 
 3. Letter from Warren Buffett, CEO of Berkshire Hathaway, to Share-
holders (Feb. 28, 2006), available at 
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2005.html. 
I
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“shameful” and “the height of irresponsibility.”4 Yet actual re-
forms have been rare,5 generally adopted only to curb highly 
publicized, company-specific excesses. Section 409A of the In-
ternal Revenue Code (“Tax Code”), for example, was enacted 
after the Enron scandal and aims to prevent executive plunder 
of companies at the expense of shareholders and employees.6 
The limit on the amount of annual compensation that compa-
nies are allowed to deduct as a reasonable and necessary busi-
ness expense under Section 162(m) of the Tax Code was simi-
larly targeted.7 But with the events that triggered the Great 
Recession vindicating scholars’ long-standing claim that exist-
ing pay regulations fail to incentivize sound corporate govern-
ance,8 such criticism gained a foothold with voters, vaulting 
systemic reform to the top of many a political agenda.9 Indeed, 
the focus on executive compensation at the September 2009 
G20 Summit in Pittsburgh reflected global pressure to recali-
brate practices to both speed economic recovery and avoid fur-
ther crises, with Germany and France advocating aggressive 
global regulation and significant change.10 
                                                                                                             
 4. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Stephen Labaton, Obama Calls Wall Street Bo-
nuses ‘Shameful,’ N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2009, at A1. 
 5. Warren Buffet famously lamented the situation in his 2003 letter to 
Berkshire Hathaway shareholders: “In judging whether Corporate America is 
serious about reforming itself, CEO pay remains the acid test. To date, the 
results aren’t encouraging.” Letter from Warren Buffett, CEO of Berkshire 
Hathaway, to Shareholders (Feb. 27, 2004), available at 
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/letters.html. 
 6. See Andrew Liazos, Ghost of Enron Wreaks New Havoc on Exec Pay, 
CFO.COM (June 13, 2011), 
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/14581582/c_14581713. 
 7. See Daniel Nelson, Section 162(m) Revisited, TAXPROF BLOG 1 (Jan. 14, 
2005), http://www.lawprofessorblogs.com/taxprof/linkdocs/2005-686-1.pdf. 
 8. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 
61–64 (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-
FCIC.pdf. 
 9. Nina Easton, Main Street Turns Against Wall Street, CNN MONEY, 
http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/26/news/economy/easton_backlash.fortune/inde
x.htm (last updated Sept. 28, 2008, 11:03 AM). 
 10. See Edmund L. Andrews, Leaders of G-20 Vow to Reshape Global 
Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2009, at A1; Markus Dettmer et al., G-20 Na-
tions Divided over How to Fix World Economy, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L (Sept. 
22, 2009), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,650449-
2,00.html. 
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Finding a “fix” is of course easier said than done. As they 
choose which kinds of regulations to enact in order to avoid an-
other Great Recession, government leaders around the world 
must grapple with the difficult issues that lie at the heart of 
executive compensation reform, implementing sound corporate 
governance measures that allow boards the necessary flexibil-
ity to recruit the talented professionals needed to grow the 
company and benefit its shareholders without enthroning a 
management team whose cost outweighs the benefits it pro-
vides. This requires regulators to choose where to draw the line 
between short-term profit maximization and long-term compa-
ny stability and performance, a difficult task further compli-
cated by seemingly irreconcilable interests. Fortune 500 com-
panies, fearful of losing their ability to attract “the best and the 
brightest,” lobby intensely against pay restrictions.11 This lob-
bying is in turn viewed with outraged contempt by academia, 
the public, and the media, who find it deeply unfair that the 
very institutions and individuals that brought the world econ-
omy to its knees continue to enjoy extraordinary benefits.12 In 
response to the banking crisis following the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008, regulators were more or less 
forced to take some action, implementing policies targeting the 
financial services sector. For example, in October 2009, Ken-
neth Feinberg, President Obama’s Pay Czar, announced severe 
pay cuts for senior management at institutions that had re-
ceived—but not repaid—funds through the Troubled Asset Re-
lief Program (“TARP”).13 In France, laws enacted in the fall of 
2008 required banks receiving bailout money to curb executive 
                                                                                                             
 11. See Colin Barr, Who Cares if Wall Street ‘Talent’ Leaves?, CNN MONEY, 
http://money.cnn.com/2009/10/23/news/newsmakers/fed.feinberg.fortune/?post
version=2009102310 (last updated Oct. 23, 2009, 10:13 AM). For reactions to 
the Pay Czar’s salary cuts, see David Ellis & Ed Henry, Pay Czar Issues Sal-
ary Caps for Execs, CNN MONEY, 
http://money.cnn.com/2009/12/11/news/companies/feinberg_compensation/ind
ex.htm (last updated Dec. 11, 2009); Steven Brill, What’s a Bailed-Out Bank-
er Really Worth?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2010, at MM32. 
 12. See, e.g., Patricia O’Connell, Executive Compensation and Public Out-
rage, BUSINESSWEEK.COM (Mar. 1, 2010), 
http://www.businessweek.com/managing/content/feb2010/ca20100224_089346
.htm. 
 13. See Stephen Labaton, U.S. to Order Pay Cuts at Firms That Got Most 
Aid, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/22/business/22pay.html. 
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pay practices and shift their business strategies to prioritize 
credit for homeowners and small businesses.14 However, de-
spite a proliferation of these types of limited reforms, action 
was lacking when it came to comprehensive compensation reg-
ulations; efforts to reach a consensus at the Pittsburgh G20 
Summit a year later belied the trepidation of many world lead-
ers in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis.15 
One notable exception to the then-global failure to commit 
was Germany, which took decisive action to try to systemically 
change executive compensation structures extraordinarily 
quickly. In addition to its advocacy for global reform at the 
Pittsburgh G20, Germany passed the Vorstandsvergütung-
sangemessenheitsgesetz (“VorstAG”) on June 18, 2009.16 Appli-
cable to all publicly traded German companies, the VorstAG 
aimed to change the way executive compensation is discussed 
and structured, increase the transparency of executive compen-
sation, and encourage companies to focus on long-term perfor-
mance in lieu of short-term gains.17 Among other things, the 
VorstAG holds supervisory boards liable for compensation 
choices, introduces “Say-on-Pay” measures to allow sharehold-
ers to vote on executive pay, and requires a long-term basis for 
performance assessment.18 Enacting these laws was a particu-
larly significant step in buttressing German corporate govern-
ance requirements in securities regulation and in executive 
compensation, which have historically been less robust than 
corporate governance measures affecting U.S. companies.19 
                                                                                                             
 14. See France—Economy and Trade of France, QFINANCE, 
http://www.qfinance.com/country-profiles/france (last visited Dec. 26, 2012); 
Lionel Laurent, A Modest Bailout for France’s Banks, FORBES.COM (Oct. 21, 
2008, 2:45 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2008/10/21/bnp-banks-update-
markets-equity-cx_ll_1021markets14.html. 
 15. See Dettmer et al., supra note 10. Even then, the final decision related 
only to banker bonuses, a far cry from comprehensive regulation. See Patrick 
Wintour & Andrew Clark, G20 Leaders Split over Banker Bonus Curbs, 
GUARDIAN, Sept. 25, 2009, at 1. 
 16. For a good explanation of the law and situating the law within the 
broader context of reform, see, for example, KPMG’s Audit Comm. Inst., Auf 
einen Blick: Die neue Vorstandsvergütung KPMG (July 2009), 
http://www.kpmg.de/Themen/15882.htm. 
 17. Germany Introduces New Rules on Management Board Compensation, 
Briefing (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, London, U.K.), Aug. 2009, at 1. 
 18. Id. at 2, 3. 
 19. While Germany is often cited as lagging behind the United States in 
corporate governance matters, this is untrue in a large number of areas, such 
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That the reform laws were pushed through by German Chan-
cellor Angela Merkel over strong objections from the business 
community, a group that traditionally supports Merkel’s con-
servative party, also signals German dedication to new execu-
tive compensation structures.20 
Too often, discussions about executive compensation reform 
devolve into abstract discussions of hypothetical and assumed 
interests, reactions, and consequences, leading to paralysis ra-
ther than action. One need only look to the missed deadlines 
and extended wrangling over the Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), both before and after its 
passage, for confirmation.21 By analyzing and evaluating the 
new German executive compensation laws contained in the 
VorstAG, this Article seeks to inject a dose of reality into the 
debate. The VorstAG, as detailed below, makes an excellent 
candidate for this type of evaluation for several reasons. First, 
all public companies discuss their compensation strategies in 
their annual reports, which are freely available on their respec-
tive websites. Second, VorstAG became applicable law within a 
very short time frame; it was passed by the Bundestag on June 
18, 2009, and entered into force in its entirety before the end of 
                                                                                                             
as takeover law. For a more complete coverage of German corporate govern-
ance measures in this and other areas, see generally STEFAN GRUNDMANN, 
EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW: ORGANIZATION, FINANCE AND CAPITAL MARKETS (2d 
ed. 2012). 
 20. See Joachim Jahn, Gesetzespläne Experten: Manager aus Aufsichtsrat 
fernhalten, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE (May 25, 2009), 
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/recht-steuern/gesetzesplaene-experten-
manager-aus-aufsichtsrat-fernhalten-1626988.html; see also Letter from Ber-
lin: Merkel Takes on the Fat Cats, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L (Dec. 11, 2007), 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,522480,00.html. 
 21. See DealBook, Senator Dodd to Press Financial Reform Ahead, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 8, 2009, 5:14 AM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/12/08/senator-dodd-to-press-financial-
reform-ahead-aides/?scp=11&sq=dodd+frank&st=nyt; Peter Alpern, Dissent 
and Political Wrangling Leaves Financial Overhaul Tottering, 
BUSINESSFINANCE (June 20, 2011), 
http://businessfinancemag.com/article/dissent-and-political-wrangling-leaves-
financial-overhaul-tottering-0620. The post-bill passage wrangling was satiri-
cally documented on The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, in which John Oliver 
portrayed a tattered version of the bill. The Daily Show: Dodd Frank Update, 
(Comedy Central television broadcast July 28, 2011), available at 
http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/thu-july-28-2011/dodd-frank-update. 
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the summer—the majority of it the next day.22 The timing 
makes it relatively simple to pinpoint the moment when com-
panies were required to incorporate VorstAG-related changes 
into their compensation policy. Third, the laws were cohesive 
and extensive enough to outline a clear compensation philoso-
phy, resulting in clear strategies that public companies needed 
to adopt. It is therefore relatively simple to identify certain 
types of changes in annual reports or other ad hoc press releas-
es that can be traced back to the VorstAG. Finally, the rule was 
not adopted in connection with broader corporate governance or 
executive compensation reform, on either the German or the 
European level. The law stands alone, and as such, it is rela-
tively safe to surmise that the VorstAG was the catalyst for 
changes to executive compensation policy by public companies 
that were implemented in its immediate aftermath. In short, 
the VorstAG is a targeted, measurable law, and a thoughtful 
examination of whether and how it prompted changes in execu-
tive compensation structure and disclosure can provide facts 
about what has worked and what has been a challenge, and 
can thereby help address the speculative “what ifs” of the de-
bate on executive compensation reform. Did the VorstAG en-
danger German management practices and even German com-
panies as the critics feared?23 Did the law inaugurate a new era 
of corporate governance as the proponents hoped?24 And on a 
more basic level, did anything in fact change? 
An examination of the publicly available documents from the 
Deutscher Aktien IndeX, or the DAX 30, answers the final 
question with a resounding “yes.”25 The compensation disclo-
sure of DAX 30 companies today looks far different than it did 
even three years ago. By requiring companies to shift their 
compensation strategies to focus on “sustainability,” the gov-
                                                                                                             
 22. See Benedikt Hohaus & Christoph Weber, Inkrafttreten des Gesetzes 
zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung und Änderungen des deutschen 
Corporate Governance Kodex, P + P Pöllath & Partners (June 23, 2009), 
http://www.pplaw.de/_downloads/publications/Mdt-Info/090623-CI-
Vorstandsverguetung.pdf. 
 23. See, e.g., Manager protestieren bei Merkel, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 
(May 22, 2009), http://www.faz.net/-gqi-12khh. 
 24. VorstAG, Bundestag verschärft Regelungen zur Vorstandsgütung, 
PERSPEKTIVEMITTELSTAND, (June 19, 2009), http://www.perspektive-
mittelstand.de/VorstAG-Bundestag-verschaerft-Regelungen-zur-
Vorstandsguetung/management-wissen/2714.html. 
 25. For details on the changes, see infra Parts III and IV. 
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ernment explicitly extends Germany’s sustainability-based ap-
proach to corporate governance into the compensation realm. 
German companies have historically been run on the stake-
holder basis: the company has responsibility not only to share-
holders, as in the American model, but also to employees, credi-
tors, suppliers, and anyone else who might have a stake in the 
company.26 Maximizing profits at the expense of one group is 
anathema, and the VorstAG makes clear that compensation 
packages are not exempt from this consideration. 
This Article, then, analyzes and evaluates the new German 
executive compensation standards set forth the VorstAG on 
their own terms and seeks to find applicable lessons from their 
implementation in Germany that could help shape additional 
U.S. compensation reform or even provide a basis for interna-
tional regulation. Part I examines the American side of the 
equation, including the much-decried compensation culture, 
the discussion surrounding it, and attempts to reform it, up to 
and including the latest Dodd-Frank developments. Part II 
crosses the Atlantic to explore corporate governance culture in 
Germany and how it has grown, including the development and 
implementation of the VorstAG. Part III addresses the concrete 
ways in which compensation structure and disclosure within 
the DAX 30 have changed since the implementation of the 
VorstAG, based on a careful examination of the compensation 
disclosures of these companies, largely in their annual reports, 
from 2008 to 2010. Part IV takes a hard look at the actual ef-
fects of the VorstAG based on the material discussed in Part 
III, discusses how executive compensation practices and cul-
ture in Germany were expected to change as a result of the new 
law, and evaluates the degree to which any changes lived up to 
expectations, whether of the lawmakers or of the critics. Part V 
presents lessons that can be drawn from the VorstAG in Ger-
many that might help reinvigorate the largely stalled U.S. dis-
cussion about how to solve the executive compensation prob-
lem. The possibilities for harmonizing executive compensation 
regulation at the international level also receive consideration 
in Part V, before turning to a brief conclusion. 
                                                                                                             
 26. See infra text accompanying note 101. 
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I. U.S. BACKGROUND 
A. Prior Compensation Reform 
It is not surprising that executive compensation is particular-
ly contentious in the United States. As the “land of opportuni-
ty,” the United States provided fertile ground for successful 
businessmen to earn vast amounts of money; critics followed 
shortly on their heels. The sums earned and spent by the so-
called robber barons at the turn of the twentieth century were 
detailed—and heavily criticized—in the press in hopes of giving 
rise to reform.27 Indeed, the detailed coverage of one particular-
ly lavish party thrown in 1905 by James Hyde, the majority 
shareholder of Equitable Insurance, that cost at the time any-
where between $50,000 and $200,000 depending upon the 
source, led to a government investigation to determine whether 
any company funds had been misused to fund the festivities, 
and ultimately to new laws regulating the insurance indus-
try.28 Despite such public outcry, salaries continued to climb. 
By 1928, executives running some of the largest U.S. corpora-
tions were earning as much as 1.5 million U.S. dollars (“USD”) 
annually.29 Understandably, executive compensation came un-
der sharp criticism shortly after the onset of the Great Depres-
sion. President Franklin Roosevelt minced no words with re-
spect to what he viewed as irresponsible business practices, 
making clear in his 1933 inauguration speech his disdain for 
those same executives who had ruled over commercial ex-
change in the pre-Depression era.30 Accordingly, the New Deal 
Congress moved quickly to impose the first regulations on ex-
ecutive compensation, which can be found in the Securities Act 
of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Revenue 
Acts of 1934, 1936, and 1938.31 
                                                                                                             
 27. See Jerry W. Markham, Regulating Executive Compensation—Why 
Bother?, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L., 277, 279–80 (2007). 
 28. See generally PATRICIA BEARD, AFTER THE BALL (2003) (recounting 
James Hyde’s lavish costume ball and describing the ensuing government 
investigation and outcries for reform). 
 29. George T. Washington, The Corporation Executive’s Living Wage, 54 
HARV. L. REV. 730, 734 (1941). 
 30. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 
1933), available at http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3280. 
 31. See Washington, supra note 29, at 735. 
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After this flurry of activity, which also included some linger-
ing court challenges to various executive compensation packag-
es,32 the issue remained largely dormant until the early 1990s. 
The nineties saw the start of what we will call the modern ex-
ecutive compensation reform era, which has seen a high level of 
regulation and contention and stretches into the present day. It 
is marked by a cycle of targeted regulations to curb certain ex-
cesses, followed first by one or more executive pay scandals and 
then by new targeted regulations to root out previously ignored 
excesses perceived to have caused the problem. This era began 
in 1991, when then-presidential candidate Bill Clinton includ-
ed in his platform a promise to trim the over-the-top executive 
compensation of the 1980s through the Tax Code by limiting 
the amount companies could deduct from their taxes as rea-
sonable and necessary compensation to 1 million USD, unless 
the pay was tied to performance criteria.33 Passed into law as 
Section 162(m) of the Tax Code by the Omnibus Budget Recon-
ciliation Act of 1993, the Act was actually credited with allow-
ing remuneration to spiral even higher due to its watered-down 
language.34 
Indeed, despite the new regulation, two executive scandals 
followed shortly on its heels: the Disney case and the Enron col-
lapse. In Disney, shareholders brought a derivative lawsuit 
against Disney in 1997 for wasting corporate assets by paying 
Michael Ovitz a severance package worth approximately 130 
million USD, of which roughly 38.5 million USD was cash, 
when he was forced out of the company after less than two 
years on the job as president.35 The media coverage and the 
length of time between the actual filing and the decision—a 
decade or so—kept the case in the public eye and heightened 
                                                                                                             
 32. See Markham, supra note 27, at 282–83 (mentioning challenges to ex-
ecutive pay at Bethlehem Steel in 1931 and National City Bank in 1934). 
 33. See How Bill Clinton Helped Boost CEO Pay, BUSINESSWEEK.COM (Nov. 
26, 2006), 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_48/b4011079.htm. 
 34. See id.; Kevin J. Ryan, Note, Rethinking Section 162(m)’s Limitation on 
the Deduction of Executive Compensation: A Review of the Commentary, 15 
VA. TAX REV. 371, 371–72 (1995). 
 35. See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 35, 56–57 
(Del. 2006). 
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public outrage.36 Interestingly, there was no specific regulatory 
backlash; that was reserved for the Enron scandal, which hit in 
2001. Enron, America’s seventh largest company at the time of 
its demise, was an energy company that manipulated its 
statements of earnings, overstating its profits thanks in large 
part to an inflated valuation mechanism and the use of offshore 
accounts to mask losses and debts.37 When Enron hit its high-
est price of 90 USD per share in August of 2000, senior execu-
tives, knowing that the stock price was massively inflated from 
the revenue manipulations, began selling their shares while 
telling the general public to buy. When the true nature of En-
ron’s accounts was revealed, the share price plummeted, leav-
ing shareholders with worthless shares and also leaving legions 
of employees who had sunk their savings into the company 
with nothing for retirement.38 The story was in the news for 
months39 and spawned a library of books40 as well as an Acad-
emy Award-nominated documentary in 2006, five full years af-
ter the company entered bankruptcy.41 The movie’s tagline—
“Come see where all your money went”—encapsulated the pub-
lic outrage.42 Enron was no Disney, which struggled but re-
mained profitable. Instead, the Enron executives had fed their 
                                                                                                             
 36. See id.; Judge: Ovitz Can Keep $140 Million, NBCNEWS.COM (Aug. 10, 
2005, 10:35 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8887620/ns/business-
us_business/t/judge-ovitz-can-keep-million-disney-pay/#.UNvjJI6_3fg. 
 37. See Dan Ackman, Enron the Incredible, FORBES.COM (Jan. 15, 2002, 
12:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2002/01/15/0115enron.html. 
 38. See Kurt Eichenwald with Diana B. Henriques, Enron Buffed Image to 
a Shine Even as It Rotted From Within, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2002, at 1; Leslie 
Wayne, Before Debacle, Enron Insiders Cashed in $1.1 Billion in Shares, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, at 1; ENRON: THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM (Jigsaw 
Productions 2005). 
 39. The Enron whistleblower Sherron Watkins was one of TIME’s “Persons 
of the Year,” along with Cynthia Cooper and Colleen Riley, also whistleblow-
ers. Richard Lacayo & Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year 2002: The Whis-
tleblowers, TIME (Dec. 30, 2002), 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1003998,00.html. 
 40. A quick search on Amazon.com reveals an astonishing array of plays, 
LUCY PREBBLE, ENRON (2011), carefully researched nonfiction by outsiders, 
BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE 
AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2004), and insider tell-alls, 
BRIAN CRUVER, ENRON: ANATOMY OF GREED (2006). 
 41. See Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room, IMDB, 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1016268/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2012). 
 42. See id. 
590 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 38:2 
insatiable desire for personal gain at the expense of the public, 
driving the company into the ground and wiping out the pen-
sions of far too many.43 Unstructured executive compensation 
arrangements that had allowed the executives to make a “run 
on the bank” were to blame. 
The political reaction was swift. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(“SOX”), which was passed in July 2002, contained the first re-
al attempt to reform executive compensation through direct 
regulation since President Clinton’s ill-fated initiative of the 
early 1990s. Seeking to avoid another Enron-type situation, it 
imposed restrictions on company stock sales during retirement 
plan blackout periods, required executive pay to be disgorged in 
the event of an accounting restatement, and also imposed a 
freeze on extraordinary payments to executives where those 
individuals were charged with violating securities laws.44 Even 
if SOX had not been explicitly passed as a reaction to the out-
cry over Enron, as well as the similar WorldCom,45 an Ameri-
can public intimately familiar with the facts of the case could 
see how the government was trying to shore up the system to 
prevent recurrence. Two years after SOX was passed, Enron 
was still affecting compensation legislation. Under the Ameri-
can Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Section 409A was added to the 
Tax Code to try to prevent executive plunder of companies at 
the expense of shareholders and employees by placing strict 
                                                                                                             
 43. See An Overview of the Enron Collapse: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 107th Cong. 13–15 (2001) (statement of 
Robert Vigil, Elec. Machinist Working Foreman, Portland Gen. Elec. Pel-
ton/Round Butte Hydroelectric Project), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107shrg82282/pdf/CHRG-
107shrg82282.pdf; Paul Murphy, Outrage at Enron’s $55m Bonuses, 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 7, 2001), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2001/dec/07/corporatefraud.enron; Don 
van Natta, Jr., Bipartisan Outrage but Few Mea Culpas in Capital, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 25, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/25/business/enron-s-
collapse-the-impact-bipartisan-outrage-but-few-mea-culpas-in-capital.html. 
 44. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act—Implications for Executive Compensation, 
MCDERMOTT, WILL & EMERY (Aug. 2002), 
http://www.mwe.com/publications/uniEntity.aspx?xpST=PublicationDetail&p
ub=5788. Nearly all law firms have devoted significant online resources to 
explaining SOX provisions to their clients and helping them with compliance. 
See, e.g., id. 
 45. For a pessimistic take, see Liazos, supra note 6. 
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limits on deferred compensation.46 It did so mainly by ensuring 
that executives could not influence the timing of severance and 
other payments, thereby eliminating their ability to “raid the 
bank” and withdraw massive amounts when such sums were 
most needed by the company to stay afloat.47 
B. Culture 
The new millennium also saw the rise of a new movement of 
academic criticism from the legal perspective, starting with an 
article published in the University of Chicago Law Review by 
Lucian Bebchuk, Jesse Fried, and David Walker entitled 
“Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Exec-
utive Compensation.”48 Rather than seeing executive compen-
sation as the result of an “optimal contract approach,” whereby 
the goal is to minimize agency costs between principals (i.e., 
shareholders, who own the company) and agents hired to run 
the business on their behalf (i.e., executives) so as to maximize 
shareholder value,49 the authors took a darker view of the mat-
ter.50 They instead saw compensation schemes as resulting 
from the “managerial power” approach. Under the “managerial 
power” theory, setting compensation is not the result of an 
arms-length bargain, but rather the managers’ use of their 
power to inflate their salaries and extract rent payments far 
higher than they deserve.51 The executive’s insatiable appetite 
is not constrained by the board as another agent of the share-
holders, but instead by the “outrage” their package will gener-
ate vis-à-vis the shareholders and the public at large.52 While 
these “outrage costs” limit executive demand, they also incen-
                                                                                                             
 46. See Executive Compensation After the American Jobs Creation Act, 
EXEC. COMP. L. ALERT (Loeb & Loeb LLP, L.A.), Jan. 2010. 
 47. See id. For an overview of the ways 409A affects severance arrange-
ments, see generally James V. Telfer & Emilie C. Mathieu, Drafting Sever-
ance Provisions in Executive Employment Agreements After I.R.C. §409A, 
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 48. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried, & David I. Walker, Managerial 
Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 751, 753–54 (2002). 
 49. For a more detailed description of this agency relationship, see Michael 
C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behav-
ior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
 50. See Bebchuk, Fried, & Walker, supra note 48, at 754–55. 
 51. See id. 
 52. Id. at 756. 
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tivize executives to act less than honorably, resorting to more 
complicated pay structures to “camouflage” their actual com-
pensation, including options,53 which incidentally are often 
conveniently structured to be performance-related and there-
fore benefit from Section 162(m). The ensuing reduction in 
shareholder value from these typically economically inefficient 
remuneration schemes adopted largely for the sake of camou-
flage is one of the most pernicious results of the managerial 
power approach, according to Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker.54 
They go on to cite numerous examples of perverse pay practices 
that can only be explained by a managerial power approach, 
including use of in-the-money options, option repricing, and 
golden parachute payments.55 
This argument—later the basis for a book co-authored by 
Bebchuk and Fried, Pay Without Performance—has changed 
the way that executive compensation is discussed and regulat-
ed in the United States.56 By highlighting the endemic struc-
tural problem in executive compensation, Bebchuk, Fried, and 
Walker established a causal link between corporate culture and 
the “problem” of executive compensation.57 Subsequent litera-
                                                                                                             
 53. Id. at 756–57. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See id. at 757–61. An in-the-money option is an option to buy a stock 
for a price less than its current market value. Option repricing is a procedure 
whereby stocks that are significantly out of the money, i.e., their strike price 
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acquisition, hostile takeover, etc.). 
 56. It has also turned Bebchuk and Fried into household names in the ex-
ecutive compensation arena. Indeed, Bebchuk was asked to give expert tes-
timony in 2007 to the House Financial Services Committee on Shareholder 
Advisor Votes on Compensation. Hearing on Empowering Shareholders on 
Executive Compensation Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 110th 
Cong. (2007) (written testimony of Lucian A. Bebchuk, William J. Friedman 
and Alicia Townsend Friedman Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance, 
and Director of the Corporate Governance Program Harvard Law School), 
available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/. 
 57. For articles exploring this topic, see Arthur Levitt, Jr., Corporate Cul-
ture and the Problem of Executive Compensation, 30 J. CORP. L. 749, 749–50 
(2004); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation: If There’s a Problem, 
What’s the Remedy? The Case for “Compensation Discussion and Analysis,” 30 
J. CORP. L. 675, 676 (2004). 
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ture has in large part been guided by their article and falls into 
two groups. The first includes those who built on various por-
tions of what Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker had described, in-
cluding further elaboration on the kinds of inefficiencies stock 
options created and the risks they incentivized,58 and assess-
ments of whether compensation consultants are truly inde-
pendent or simply another tool managers use to extract higher 
rents under the managerial power theory.59 The second group 
includes those who try to find a solution to the problem of 
managerial power posed by Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, name-
ly via some other form of control, such as transparency in the 
Compensation Discussion and Analysis (“CD&A”) portion of a 
company’s proxy statement60 or the mitigating influence of the 
institutional investor.61 There have been astonishingly few ar-
ticles that argue against Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker’s basic 
premise; even Judge Richard Posner acknowledges, albeit in a 
limited manner, that the pay without performance problem is 
real and more dire than he had foreseen.62 He goes so far as to 
suggest that colleagues who say the costs of regulation out-
weigh the benefits should not stand in the way of reform.63 In 
evaluating political reforms since Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker’s 
2002 publication, it is easy to identify how the dialogue around 
their article has changed the concept of the problem to be fixed. 
For example, the rules on taxation of deferred compensation 
passed in 2004 and required to be implemented for all existing 
compensation arrangements by December 31, 2008, essentially 
                                                                                                             
 58. See Wm. Gerard Sanders & Donald C. Hambrick, Swinging for the 
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 61. See Jay C. Hartzell & Laura T. Starks, Institutional Investors and Ex-
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 63. Id. 
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force companies to set a rigid payment structure in place or 
else face excise taxes that can essentially wipe out the value of 
any payments.64 Thus, the Tax Code structures the timing of 
the payments,65 not the executive or the board because, as es-
tablished by Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker’s premise, the two are 
colluding, whether or not they mean to. The clear implication is 
that the parties negotiating executive compensation are not to 
be trusted. The clearest result of Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker’s 
influence, however, was the U.S. legislative reaction to the 
2007 financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act, which sought to re-
quire a very clear disclosure tactic to cut through the camou-
flage—the comparison of CEO pay to median pay, a rule which 
has yet to be implemented.66 
C. Dodd-Frank 
The 2007 financial crisis was arguably the first great econom-
ic crisis in America for which compensation explicitly bore a 
significant amount of the blame, which is perhaps why the leg-
islative response was slightly broader than prior targeted at-
tempts.67 Though the cause of the crisis was largely deemed to 
                                                                                                             
 64. See Telfer & Mathieu, supra note 47. For this reason, law firms started 
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frank/accomplishments.shtml#cgov (last modified Feb. 6, 2013). 
 67. In the Great Depression, criticism of executive compensation came 
afterwards as part of a continuing pattern of trouble in America, and the 
small 2001–2002 recession had more to do with the tech bubble bursting and 
9/11 than it ever did with compensation. However, given that even these ma-
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be the real estate bubble and the sale of derivatives that pack-
aged the resulting mortgages together,68 investment in these 
toxic financial products was seen as being a matter of executive 
compensation.69 More specifically, these funds were created, 
sold, and chosen as investment vehicles because they brought 
significant short-term gain, which CEO compensation packages 
were geared to reward.70 Even before analyses of the roots of 
the financial crisis came to the fore, tempers were already flar-
ing over the division of riches: while the American economy fell 
headlong into recession, layoffs and all, during the fall and 
winter of 2008 to 2009, the very banks that had been propped 
up by taxpayer money were preparing to pay millions in bonus-
es.71 The restrictions on executive pay to ailing financial insti-
tutions receiving federal aid contained in the October 2008 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (“EESA”)72 and the ap-
pointment of a federal “Pay Czar” to oversee pay packages at 
such institutions did little to calm the ensuing furor. In Janu-
ary 2009, a bill was introduced in the Senate to limit total ex-
ecutive compensation at bailed-out financial institutions to a 
total of 400,000 USD.73 In introducing the bill, sponsor Senator 
Claire McCaskill “call[ed] Wall Street executives ‘a bunch of 
idiots’ who were ‘kicking sand in the face of the American tax-
payer.’”74 Though the final EESA regulations, which were also 
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 69. Id. at 64. 
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Murphy, Kenneth L. Trefftzs Chair in Finance, University of Southern Cali-
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 73. Murphy, Hearing on TARP, supra note 72, at 5. 
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“blended” with additional compensation regulations proposed 
by the Obama team, were indeed comprehensive and changed 
executive pay at least in the short run,75 the restrictions only 
applied to those institutions that had accepted emergency 
funds from the government, namely large firms in the financial 
sector.76 As such, EESA fits within the general piecemeal pat-
tern of prior regulation. The situation also offered a sort of per-
fect storm for more stringent regulations: given that these 
companies were arguably being kept afloat by taxpayer money, 
the government had viable leverage to impose restrictions far 
more severe than it would have otherwise been able to. Indeed, 
the financial institutions found these restrictions so onerous 
that many hurried to repay federal assistance solely for the 
purpose of regaining control over their compensation policies.77 
The first attempt at comprehensive pay regulation to deal 
with the broader lessons of the Great Recession came almost 
two years after EESA in Dodd-Frank, signed into law by Presi-
dent Obama on July 21, 2010.78 Over a year in the making, the 
law was contentious from the start, passing only on party-line 
voting under a Democratic Congress,79 and drew its power 
largely from the authority granted to it to regulate public com-
panies under the Securities and Exchange Acts. Rather than 
treating the symptoms, it aimed to stem the cause of the prob-
lems, with the ambitious aim of combating the compensation 
failures at public companies that had more broadly hastened, 
or at least contributed to, the onset of the financial crisis.80 Un-
der Dodd-Frank, public companies are required to give share-
holders a non-binding say-on-pay vote at least once every three 
years; implement and disclose a clawback policy; disclose 
whether the CEO and chairman positions are held by the same 
person and if so, why; ensure its compensation committee 
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members are fully independent, not unlike audit committee 
members, and wield certain oversight responsibilities; and 
draft annual proxy statements that contain a clear description 
of the relationship between executive compensation and the 
company’s performance as well as the ratio of the median of all 
salaries, excluding that of the CEO, to the CEO’s compensa-
tion.81 
Dodd-Frank, then, would seem to imply a new era of execu-
tive compensation regulation in the United States, providing 
investors with new information and giving them a say on com-
pensation which, while non-binding, has been shown, at the 
very least, to mitigate so-called “pay for failure.”82 However, the 
law remains highly contentious. Republicans in particular are 
vociferous in calling for its repeal, in whole or in part; the fi-
nancial industry has spent a great deal of money lobbying 
against it; and the law has also suffered setbacks in court.83 In 
addition, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), 
charged with enacting many of the rules and regulations to 
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carry out the law, including all of the executive compensation 
provisions, is woefully behind on its rule-making schedule.84 
According to a one-year anniversary report on the progress 
made in implementing Dodd-Frank published by the law firm 
Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, as of July 22, 2011, regulators 
had only completed thirty-three of the 163 required rule-
makings; in other words, they had only met roughly 20% of the 
rulemaking requirements in the year following Dodd-Frank’s 
passage.85 Furthermore, executive compensation has received 
only secondary attention—the top five topics for meetings with 
outside groups on proposed regulations as of the one-year anni-
versary did not include executive compensation.86 Rulemaking 
has also progressed at a slow pace: while say-on-pay rules were 
promulgated in January 2011, it was not until a year and a 
half later in June 2012 that the SEC re-visited the topic of ex-
ecutive compensation, and no rules have been issued in the 
months since.87 
Where, then, does this leave executive compensation reform 
in America? Those who had hoped that Dodd-Frank might an-
swer that question are left unsatisfied, with major topics left 
unanswered. But perhaps that is part of the answer: we have 
yet to truly commit to enacting the necessary rules. On the one 
side, businesses have complained loudly about how onerous the 
regulations are, particularly the CEO-to-mean salary ratio.88 
On the other side, public ire is alive and well. An article in The 
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Washington Post in the summer of 2011 drew strings of heated 
comments from readers,89 to say nothing of the Occupy Wall 
Street movement. Even the Pay Czar himself, Ken Feinberg, 
has grown tired of the refrain that increased pay regulation 
will mean a mass departure of all the “best and the brightest” 
from the very firms that need them the most.90 In addition, 
while Dodd-Frank’s specific executive compensation changes 
were built on solid principles, they remain, to a certain degree, 
pointed: disclosure is to be changed here, requirements up-
graded there, without articulating a true philosophy that could 
give investors and companies alike a default. With this in 
mind, it is interesting to turn to Germany—a country that en-
acted a law quickly, which also came into force quickly—to see 
whether the United States might learn lessons that could alter 
the debate and instigate real change. 
II. GERMAN BACKGROUND 
A. Compensation Culture 
Though compensation culture in Germany diverges sharply 
from that in the United States in many respects, they have at 
least one point in common: excessive compensation in Germany 
is also hotly debated in politics, the media, and academic re-
search.91 The uproar two years ago caused by the fifty million 
euro severance package paid to the exiting CEO of Porsche, 
Wendelin Wiedeking, is a story similar to many of the excessive 
compensation narratives in the U.S. media.92 It is, however, 
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worth noting that unlike what his American counterpart likely 
would have done, Wiedeking not only requested a more modest 
amount, but also almost immediately promised to donate half 
of his payout to a charity sponsored by Porsche.93 Rather than 
the exception, Wiedeking is the product of a different compen-
sation culture than the United States, one where executive 
compensation has only recently reached heights of extraordi-
nary contention. This was due, likely not in small part, to the 
fact that executive compensation remained relatively low until 
around the end of the twentieth century. In 1997, Focus, a 
German magazine, published an article claiming that German 
executives were underpaid given the results they produced.94 
An examination of the list of top earners in both countries un-
derlined the point. While the top executives at Daimler-
Chrysler, BMW, VEBA, and Siemens in Germany earned be-
tween 2 and 3.5 million deutschmarks per year, their American 
counterparts at Daimler-Chrysler, GE, Intel and Healthsouth 
earned between 20 and 181 million deutschmarks.95 
Two historical reasons help explain the imbalance. First, 
German public companies are governed by the Aktiengesetz, 
which for a long time did not allow them to offer the kinds of 
stock option plans that had been pushing executive compensa-
tion in the United States upwards.96 Thus, until around 1998, 
German companies simply did not have the tools to pay their 
executives on a scale anywhere equal to executives employed 
by U.S. companies.97 The other reason has to do with German 
corporate governance. While the United States deploys what 
has been termed by some authors as “stock market” or “Anglo-
American capitalism,” Germany’s businesses have long prac-
                                                                                                             
 93. Id. 
 94. See Julie Ann Elston & Lawrence G. Goldberg, Executive Compensa-
tion and Agency Costs in Germany, 27 J. BANKING & FIN. 1391, 1393 (2003). 
 95. Id. The deutschmark was rendered obsolete by the introduction of the 
euro in 2000, but these sums would be respectively over 131 million USD for 
the U.S. group of CEOs, and between approximately 1.5 and 2.5 million USD 
for the German CEOs. See German Mark (DEM) Currency Exchange Rate 
Conversion Calculator, COINMILL.COM, 
http://coinmill.com/DEM_calculator.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2012). Regard-
less of the currency conversions, it is the scale that is impressive, with some 
U.S. CEOs earning ten times what their German counterparts did. 
 96. See Brian R. Cheffins, The Metamorphosis of “Germany Inc.”: The Case 
of Executive Pay, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 497, 511 (2001). 
 97. See id. 
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ticed “welfare capitalism” instead.98 Under the Anglo-American 
model, the company is seen as being run for the benefit of the 
shareholders, which means stock value is paramount, along 
with the mutually reinforcing institutions that allow this value 
to properly reflect that of the company, including disclosure 
and accounting rules promoting a full and fair depiction of the 
company, and hostile takeovers, by which an inefficient man-
agement board is replaced by another that will better run the 
company for the shareholders.99 The company is highly capital-
ized and has a dispersed shareholder base.100 Welfare capital-
ism, on the other hand, prioritizes all of the stakeholders of the 
company, from employees to creditors to shareholders.101 
Groups of influential stakeholders tend to be employees and 
banks, who, as insiders, benefit from strong information disclo-
sure, as opposed to outsiders, who receive far less information 
than under the Anglo-American model.102 The company is not 
as highly capitalized, seeking much of its financing from banks 
that have close ties to the company as shareholders and major 
creditors.103 The difference in models has a significant impact 
on executive compensation, among other strategic decisions.104 
The argument for share-based compensation theoretically 
makes a great deal more sense under the Anglo-American 
model, because it ties the interests of the executive to those of 
the constituency he or she is expected to serve. Under welfare 
capitalism, the argument goes, executive compensation will be 
kept low because of the influence of employees and creditors on 
the compensation-setting process. In short, welfare capitalism 
should, in theory, be more egalitarian and more sustainable 
than the Anglo-American model.105 
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However, in the past ten years, much ink has been spilled 
proclaiming the end of welfare capitalism.106 The two largest 
executive compensation sensations in Germany prior to the fi-
nancial crisis (and to Wiedeking’s severance controversy) both 
spurred public outrage and served as examples to prove that 
changing compensation structures marked a shift away from 
welfare capitalism, bringing with it the need for increased reg-
ulation. The first of these sensations was the Daimler-Chrysler 
merger at the end of the 1990s. As pointed out in numerous ar-
ticles at the time, the difference in compensation philosophy 
and actual pay at the two companies was astonishing. In 1997, 
the entire management board of Daimler—ten people—
collectively earned two million USD less than the vice-
chairman of Chrysler alone.107 Though some suggested that the 
Americans would have to tone down their monetary expecta-
tions, at least one compensation expert read the cards right, 
saying, “Over time, you’ll see the Daimler-Chrysler executive 
pay practice evolve into something much closer to what Chrys-
ler management is used to.”108 Indeed, in 2000, Daimler-
Chrysler implemented a five-year American-style stock option 
plan, covering some 4000 non-U.S. executives.109 By 2004, a 
mere six years after the merger, Daimler-Chrysler faced wrath 
from all sides, including the former CEO of Daimler-Benz, be-
cause executive pay had risen 130% even as the company was 
preparing to announce layoffs.110 Politicians, both liberal and 
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conservative, were quick to condemn the payments,111 and in 
the face of the outrage and strikes by employees, executives 
agreed to forego up to 10% of their pay.112 
Also in 2004, another major compensation sensation exploded 
in Germany. January marked the start of the Ackermann trial 
as a result of the Mannesmann affair,113 Germany’s version of 
the Disney litigation. In November 1999, Vodafone launched a 
hostile bid to take over Mannesmann AG, a German cell phone 
company.114 Following the lead of its CFO, Klaus Esser, share-
holders rejected the deal of 240 euro per share (Mannesmann 
had, at the time, a market value of 203 euro per share), and 
hostilities continued between the companies until a final deal 
was reached giving the shareholders 360 euro per share.115 On 
the heels of the deal, Esser was awarded a 10 million pound 
sterling bonus by members of the supervisory board, including 
Ackermann.116 The reaction by the public was overwhelmingly 
negative, but the bonus was paid nevertheless, and a month 
later, the federal attorney’s office in Düsseldorf filed charges 
against the responsible members of the board, inter alia, alleg-
ing a breach of trust.117 The matter was ultimately settled out 
of court with a payment of 5.8 million euro.118 
Though there were no further large severance payment scan-
dals until Wiedeking’s in 2007, the stage had already been set. 
Despite a relative lack of scandals and a shorter history of out-
rage, executive compensation became an issue as much in-
grained in the public ire in Germany as it was in the United 
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States. Beyond that, however, there are few similarities. Per-
haps these few scandals were treated with such venom be-
cause, in a country used to relatively modest compensation, 
these offenses seemed particularly egregious. Or perhaps the 
reaction was a call of alarm, channeling a sense that change 
was indeed afoot and that compensation was shifting to astro-
nomical proportions, much to the dissatisfaction of many.119 
B. Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation Regula-
tion in Germany 
1. German Level 
Generally speaking, Germany got into the corporate govern-
ance game relatively late. Unlike the United States, Germany 
is an entirely code-based system—new laws must be enacted by 
the Bundestag, which, for the majority of the country’s post-
World War II history, was reluctant to enact changes in corpo-
rate law.120 Whereas many corporate governance provisions in 
the United States tend to be enacted administratively, through 
the SEC—such as the requirement of a CD&A section or the 
recent addition of say-on-pay under Dodd-Frank—Germany 
has no SEC equivalent, and capital market law, far from being 
advanced to the point of a corporate governance tool, was bare-
ly regulated.121 
It is also possible that corporate structure played a role. 
Whereas in the United States, a public company is run by a 
single board of directors consisting of company management, 
such as the CEO and CFO, as well as directors from outside the 
company, a public company in Germany (an “Aktiengesell-
schaft” or “AG”) has two boards, or more precisely, a two-tier 
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board.122 One board, a management board called the Vorstand, 
is composed of “inside” directors who are employed by the com-
pany and typically includes the CEO, CFO, and other im-
portant executives.123 Under the Aktiengesetz, the law govern-
ing AGs, the Vorstand is charged with running the company, 
which it does in accordance with its own business rules and 
judgment.124 The other board, a supervisory board called the 
“Aufsichtsrat”, is made up of “outside” directors whose task is 
to supervise the work of the Vorstand and how it manages the 
company.125 The Aufsichtsrat cannot specifically instruct the 
Vorstand, but it must be consulted on certain important mat-
ters and formally approve the financial statements.126 With a 
formal supervisory system built into the AG, which contains its 
own strict demands in terms of organization, accounting, and 
legal housekeeping,127 perhaps the need for Anglo-American 
style corporate governance measures becomes less pressing.128 
In any case, change came from without, not from within, in 
the form of global competition. With the increasing Anglo-
Americanization of the international business world, retaining 
investors required investing in the Anglo-American corporate 
governance model.129 For international business, the New York 
Stock Exchange remains paramount, and companies listed on 
that exchange must comply—to differing extent for domestic 
and foreign companies—with the corporate governance provi-
sions woven into the fabric of the SEC regulations.130 Though 
foreign listed companies must comply with fewer disclosure re-
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quirements, existing U.S. requirements have historically tend-
ed to be more stringent than those in Germany at any given 
time. For example, disclosure of the compensation of individual 
executives at public companies has only been required in Ger-
many since the Vorstandsvergütungs-Offenlegungsgesetz 
(“VorstOG”) came into power on August 11, 2005;131 the U.S. 
requirement to disclose the compensation of the CEO and the 
four highest paid officers, who would typically sit on the 
Vorstand if the company were German, has been required since 
1994.132 Investors were used to seeing NYSE-listed DAX 30 
companies like Siemens and Deutsche Bank reveal this infor-
mation; therefore, it is little wonder that they might have soon 
questioned why the same information was not available from 
other German companies like Lufthansa and BMW.133 
The corporate governance debate began in earnest in Germa-
ny in the mid-1990s.134 In 2000, the German government set up 
a Corporate Governance Commission charged with identifying 
weaknesses in the German leadership and control systems in 
place in corporations, and to modernize the German system in 
light of increased globalization and international competi-
tion.135 In July 2001, the Commission presented its report, the 
fruit of twelve months of intensive discussion and international 
comparison, particularly with the British Company Law Steer-
ing Group.136 Many of the most important themes of the report 
could be categorized as allowing for better policing of the rela-
tionship between the Aufsichtsrat and the Vorstand. The report 
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stressed bettering the mechanisms that make information 
available to the Aufsichtsrat, increasing the negative conse-
quences of failure in their duties, and rendering Vorstand com-
pensation more transparent through the development of a cor-
porate governance code.137 Accordingly, a Government Com-
mission (Regierungskommission Deutsche Corporate Govern-
ance Kodex) was established in September 2001 with the ex-
press purpose of drafting precisely such a document138 and it 
was adopted by the government on February 26, 2002, and 
signed into law in July of that same year.139 
An understanding of the German Corporate Governance Code 
(the “Code”) and its history is important because the Code con-
tinues to set the tone for corporate governance in Germany. 
The themes identified by the Corporate Governance Commis-
sion not only served as the centerpiece of the final Code, but 
also run through corporate governance and reform attempts to 
this day, including the VorstAG.140 The Code provides compre-
hensive corporate governance guidance by both restating appli-
cable law already in force in the corporate governance arena 
and adding new material in the form of sixty-eight recommen-
dations and sixteen suggestions, which are aimed at improving 
transparency and heightening the trust of international inves-
tors.141 The Code is made up of seven chapters: a foreword, a 
chapter on shareholders and the annual meeting, a chapter on 
cooperation between the Vorstand and Aufsichtsrat, and sepa-
rate chapters on the Vorstand and Aufsichtsrat, transparency, 
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and financial statements.142 The recommendations within the 
Code themselves are technically not binding, but rather func-
tion on a “comply-or-explain” basis.143 That is, under Section 
161 of the Aktiengesetz, publicly traded companies must dis-
close annually the extent to which they have complied with the 
recommendations in the Code and describe the reasons for any 
non-compliance.144 The failure to comply with suggestions, on 
the other hand, need not be addressed.145 This mechanism was 
chosen because it was deemed to allow companies whose struc-
tures did not necessitate certain rules the ability to deviate 
from them. With flexibility being one of the guiding points for 
the Code, the idea was not to corset companies into inflexible 
structures.146 An additional advantage of the comply-or-explain 
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method is that theoretically it allows the market to be the ul-
timate arbitrator.147 In other words, shareholders will vote with 
their feet should they deem corporate governance provisions 
insufficient.148 
The problem with comply-or-explain, however, is that it as-
sumes there are active shareholders who are informed about 
the different provisions in the Code and disclosure levels in 
general. It further assumes that disclosure levels would trump 
other considerations such that a particular company with a 
very low disclosure level would make investment so unattrac-
tive to these active, informed shareholders that they would be 
willing to sell their shares because the company has not com-
plied with a Corporate Governance Code provision, even when 
the company might otherwise be doing well. The German gov-
ernment has thus taken an approach to corporate governance 
that might best be described as “recommendation plus.” When-
ever companies are not sufficiently following recommendations 
or suggestions in the Code, the government tends to turn them 
into binding law. A prime example deals with the disclosure of 
individualized compensation figures. In 2002, it was a sugges-
tion. In 2003, it became a recommendation.149 Finally, due to 
high levels of noncompliance, the VorstOG made it binding law 
in 2005.150 The reports of the group in charge of administering 
and updating the Code read like a preview of coming attrac-
tions, with contentious items or provisions with low levels of 
compliance later the subject of mandatory regulation.151 In a 
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press release dated March 11, 2005, for example, the chair of 
the Government Commission mentioned that the ability of a 
member of the Vorstand to accede directly to the Aufsichtsrat 
upon his retirement from the former remained a hotly debated 
topic. Few careful readers should have been surprised, then, 
when the definitive answer to this question came as part of the 
VorstAG three years later.152 
2. European-Level Governance Initiatives 
In 2013, it is impossible to speak of the corporate governance 
environment and developments in Germany without address-
ing the broader European picture.153 The European Union154 
has long been active in the realm of business law—indeed, one 
of the motivations driving unification was the desire to harmo-
nize business law to help Europe compete with the United 
States as an attractive location for merger and acquisition ac-
tivity.155 Since 2000, the European Union has become increas-
ingly active in corporate governance, a natural extension of its 
business law activism. On some level, corporate governance is 
about the decisions in a market economy that matter most for 
the public at-large, which includes investors.156 Corporate gov-
ernance measures, therefore, are of key importance for inves-
tors, providing some level assurance that the company into 
which they are sinking their money will be run according to 
certain accepted principles. What better way to win the global 
competition for investment than by using unified corporate 
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governance measures as a way to appeal to foreign investors, 
who might otherwise be wary of determining which provisions 
apply in a particular country? 
The EU signaled its entry into the corporate governance fray 
in 2003. In that year the European Commission (“EC”), the 
forerunner of the EU, published an Action Plan on “Modernis-
ing Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance,” the 
template for future corporate governance reform initiatives.157 
Like the German Code, the Action Plan was based on a report 
by high-level European company law experts.158 That the EC’s 
Competitiveness Counsel had commissioned the report further 
lent support to the idea that global competition for investors 
was a key concern.159 The Action Plan formed the standing Eu-
ropean Corporate Governance Forum, the body essentially 
tasked with carrying out the Action Plan, particularly with re-
spect to encouraging coordination of national corporate govern-
ance codes.160 Its role is essentially to track corporate govern-
ance measures and reforms by publishing and commissioning 
corporate governance evaluations of member countries.161 
These reports exert indirect pressure on governments, as they 
make it very clear to potential investors which countries com-
ply with which rules and which countries have better or worse 
track records.162 
Despite the plethora of corporate governance institutions, the 
EC/EU has historically produced little in the way of broadly 
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applicable, binding executive compensation regulation.163 Ef-
forts to date have yielded only one binding directive related to 
remuneration,164 Directive 2010/76/EU, which requires finan-
cial institutions to implement “remuneration policies and prac-
tices that are consistent with effective risk management.”165 
Aside from this directive, the EC/EU has typically handled re-
muneration matters by recommendation, which unlike direc-
tives, are not required to be implemented by member coun-
tries.166 The first recommendation on director’s pay came in 
2004, shortly after the EC began to step up its corporate gov-
ernance efforts.167 This non-binding recommendation suggested 
that companies release a statement on general remuneration 
policy, include the matter in the agenda for the shareholders 
meeting, disclose individual executive remuneration, and re-
quire shareholder approval of share-based remuneration 
plans.168 Additional recommendations were issued in 2009, in 
the wake of a 2007 report discussing compliance with the 2004 
recommendation and the financial crisis.169 These new recom-
mendations were far more precise and showed a more nuanced 
understanding of executive compensation and how it needed to 
be reformed, with eight separate recommendations that ad-
dressed the structure of directors’ remuneration as well as the 
process of setting the remuneration.170 The recommendations 
                                                                                                             
 163. For a history of the European Commission’s involvement with remu-
neration, see Remuneration Policies, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
http://ec.Europa.eu/internal_market/company/directors-remun/index_en.htm 
(last visited Dec. 30, 2012). 
 164. Id. 
 165. European Parliament and Council Directive 2010/76, 2010 O.J. (L 329) 
3, 3 available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:329:0003:0035:EN:P
DF [hereinafter Directive 2010/76]. 
 166. See Remuneration Policies, supra note 163. 
 167. Press Release, European Union, Directors’ Pay–Commission Sets Out 
Guidance on Disclosure and Shareholder Control (Oct. 6, 2004), available at 
http://Europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/1183&format
=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See Commission Recommendation on Remuneration Policies in the Fi-
nancial Services Sector, at 2, 3, SEC (2009) 580 (April 30, 2009). 
 170. Press Release, European Union, Directors’ Pay: Commission Sets Out 
Further Guidance on Structure and Determination of Directors’ Remunera-
tion, (Apr. 29, 2009), available at 
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suggested, among other things, clawbacks, increasing the link 
between pay and performance, requiring a balance between 
fixed and variable pay, and a number of other targeted 
measures.171 Some might question whether the VorstAG was 
influenced by this latest round of recommendations, which was 
made public on April 29, 2009, only a few months before the 
passage of the VorstAG.172 However, this seems unlikely. While 
the VorstAG was not yet in force when the recommendations 
were published, it had already been proposed, with comments 
well underway, none of which reference the new European rec-
ommendations.173 It is also worth remembering that much of 
what became law in the VorstAG had existed in the German 
Corporate Governance Code, a document that the EC/EU poli-
cies took into account when framing their recommendations.174 
                                                                                                             
http://Europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/673&format=
HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. This is not also the first time that Germany has overtaken EU ini-
tiatives, essentially preempting EU directives on specific matters. The Gesetz 
über die aufsichtsrechtlichen Anforderungen an die Vergütungssysteme von 
Instituten und Versicherungsunternehmen, Germany’s post-financial crisis 
banking law, which also contained restrictions on banking remuneration, for 
example, was initially proposed in the Fall of 2009 and finally became effec-
tive in its entirety on July 27, 2010. A description of the German law is avail-
able at http://www.ihk-
ber-
lin.de/servicemarken/branchen/Dienstleistungen/banken/Recht_/820436/Verg
uetung.html. The EU’s related directive, Directive 2010/76/EU is dated No-
vember 24, 2010. Directive 2010/76, supra note 165. 
 173. Indeed the Green Party was already submitting comments about the 
proposed law before it was even officially introduced by Angela Merkel’s gov-
ernment. See Antrag der Abgeordneten Chrintine Scheel et al und der Frak-
tion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, Deutscher Bundestag, März 4, 2009, 
Drucksache 16/12112, dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/121/1612112.pdf. The 
FDP issued such a commentary in late 2008 along similar lines: Antrag der 
Abgeordneten Mechthid Dyckmans et al und der Fraktion der FDP, Deutscher 
Bundestag, Nov. 12, 2008, Drucksache 16/10885, 
dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/108/1610885.pdf. 
 174. An antecedent to the VorstAG’s requirement of a two-year pause be-
tween membership on the Vorstand and the Aufsichtsrat, for instance, was 
already present in the 2007 version of the German Corporate Governance 
Code, which stated that there should be “special reasons” to justify direct 
accession to the Aufsichtsrat upon exit from the Vorstand. DEUTSCHER 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE KODEX [GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE], 
Feb. 26, 2002, as amended June 14, 2007, § 5.4.4 (Ger.), translated in German 
Corporate Governance Code, COMM’N OF THE GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
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In short, with the EU refraining from binding general compen-
sation directives, executive compensation laws and reforms in 
Germany are German at heart and respond to German prob-
lems from a German perspective. 
C. VorstAG 
1. Background and Components of the Law 
By December 2007, it was clear that executive compensation 
was on Angela Merkel’s agenda. In that month, she singled out 
exorbitant executive salaries in her speech to the annual meet-
ing of the Christian Democratic Union (“CDU”), the historically 
conservative political party that she leads as Chancellor, criti-
cizing “payouts in the realms of fantasy.”175 The business com-
munity was outraged, implying that she had endangered eco-
nomic recovery.176 Her spokesman denied that she was plan-
ning any kind of legislation to curb executive pay, while the 
opposition, the Social Democrats (“SPD”), who regarded execu-
tive pay and its reform as a staunchly liberal issue, were 
amused and dismissive of what they perceived as hypocrisy, 
since their previous calls for legislation had fallen on deaf 
ears.177 But Merkel proved the SPD wrong. Executive compen-
sation remained a constant, if not strident, theme for her 
throughout the next year. In May 2008, Merkel’s office under-
lined that, in the past, she had repeatedly made clear “that 
there was ‘little comprehension’ for managers departing with 
large severance packages after their companies had shown a 
                                                                                                             
CODE (June 14, 2007), http://www.corporate-governance-
code.de/eng/download/E_Kodex_2007_final.pdf. 
 175. Executive Pay Debate revived in Germany, DEUTSCHE PRESSE AGENTUR, 
Jan. 4, 2008, available at 
http://www.expatica.com/fr/finance_business/business/Executive-pay-debate-
revived-in-Germany_11148.html. Coming on the heels of the Wiedeking 
scandal, Merkel noted, “Just because an American car executive makes a 
thousand times what an employee earns, it seems a German car manager 
should also get the kind of rise he would never grant his workers.” Bertrand 
Benoit, Merkel in Attack on US-Style Pay Awards, FIN. TIMES UK (Dec. 4, 
2007, 2:00 AM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a04f5c50-a20b-11dc-a13b-
0000779fd2ac.html’axzz1ZowebpvY. 
 176. See Letter from Berlin, supra note 20. 
 177. Id. 
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loss,”178 and she supposedly arranged for a special task force to 
review executive compensation late that summer.179 Just a few 
months later, a CDU member and one of Merkel’s most im-
portant allies, Peter Müller, backed an SPD proposal similar to 
section 162(m).180 At the G20 summit, Merkel was expected to, 
and did, raise executive compensation reform as part of the 
new, sound financial architecture for which she advocated.181 
Given that it was already an important theme of her chancel-
lorship, and with the increased scrutiny worldwide placed on 
executive compensation in the aftermath of the financial crisis, 
it is unsurprising that Angela Merkel proposed a new executive 
compensation law in March of 2009.182 After a comment period, 
during which various governmental factions as well as outside 
experts submitted their views, the Bundestag passed the law 
on June 28, 2009, and became effective in full on August 5, 
2009.183 
The three main objectives of the VorstAG were to better align 
remuneration schemes with incentives for sustainable growth 
in the long-term, to strengthen the independence of the 
Aufsichtsrat and heighten its accountability, and to increase 
transparency of executive remuneration.184 The VorstAG at-
                                                                                                             
 178. Germany’s Social Democrats Take On Executive Pay, DEUTSCHE PRESSE 
AGENTUR, May 1, 2008, available at 
http://www.expatica.com/de/news/local_news/Germany_s-Social-Democrats-
take-aim-at-executive-pay-_42635.html. 
 179. Executive Pay—Is Intervention Required?, LEADER.CO.ZA (Aug. 2, 2008), 
http://www.leader.co.za/article.aspx?s=1&f=1&a=825. 
 180. See Hugh Williamson, Merkel Ally Backs Curbs on Executive Salaries, 
FIN. TIMES UK (May 22, 2008, 3:00 AM), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f201e98c-2799-11dd-b7cb-
000077b07658.html’axzz1ZowebpvY. 
 181. James Quinn, Merkel and Sarkozy in Last Push on Regulation, 
TELEGRAPH (Sept. 24, 2009), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/g20-
summit/6228132/Merkel-and-Sarkozy-in-last-push-on-regulation.html. 
 182. See Kabinett billigt schärfere Regeln für Managergehälter, 
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE (March 11, 2009), 
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/wirtschaftspolitik/gesetzentwurf-
kabinett-billigt-schaerfere-regeln-fuer-managergehaelter-1922930.html. 
 183. Björn Gaul & Alexandra Janz, Wahlkampgetöse im Aktienrecht: Gesetz-
liche Begrenzung der Vorstandsvergütung und Änderungen der Aufsichts-
ratstätigkeit, NZA 809 (2009). 
 184. ISS, Corporate Governance in Germany, GOVERNANCE EXCHANGE 
WEBINAR (Feb. 28, 2011, 9:30 AM), 
http://www.issproxy.com/webcasts/CorporateGovernanceinGermany2011. 
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tacks the compensation issue mainly by trying to make existing 
control instruments and mechanisms, particularly the 
Aufsichtsrat but also the shareholders, a more effective check 
on the Vorstand. Using sustainability as its philosophical start-
ing point,185 the VorstAG attempts to overhaul the perspective 
from which the Aufsichtsrat, the organ responsible for negotiat-
ing Vorstand remuneration, approaches the remuneration-
setting procedure for public companies.186 Under the VorstAG, 
Vorstand compensation must be sustainable and must be ap-
propriate with respect to Vorstand performance and should not 
surpass the typical compensation awarded in the respective 
industry without a special reason.187 In the event that the com-
pany’s financial position worsens significantly, the Aufsichtsrat 
can exercise a clawback right, regardless of whether any exists 
in the employment agreement or other contractual arrange-
ments, which will reduce the compensation of current members 
of the Vorstand as well as members of the Vorstand who have 
left the company within the past three years. In keeping with 
the trend of increasing the professionalization of the Aufsichts-
rat to make it a more effective control on the Vorstand,188 com-
pensation can be approved only by the entire Aufsichtsrat, as 
opposed to simply a human resources committee, and the 
members of the Aufsichtsrat are also personally liable in the 
event that the compensation is deemed to be inappropriately 
high. The Vorstand also faces a higher penalty for wrongdoing. 
Should the company’s director & officer liability (“D&O”) in-
surance be triggered, the offending member of the Vorstand 
must pay a deductible equal to 10% of the damages, but in no 
event greater than 1.5 times his or her annual base salary. The 
VorstAG seeks to heighten the Aufsichtsrat’s control by in-
creasing the distance between the Vorstand and the Aufsichts-
                                                                                                             
 185. Gaul & Janz, supra note 183. 
 186. The VorstAG’s applicability to only those companies traded on the 
stock exchange is guaranteed by its incorporation into the Aktiengesetz, the 
law which regulates share-based companies. 
 187. For a general explanation of the new VorstAG measures, the following 
articles are very useful: Beck, Angemessenere Vorstandsgehälter: Bundestag 
verabschiedet VorstAG, BECKLINK 283784; Dr. Holger Fleischer, Das Gesetz 
zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung (VorstAG), NZG 801 (2009). For 
more on the development of the VorstAG, see Bearbeitungsstand des 
VorstAGs, May 5, 2009 (on file with author). 
 188. Antrag der Abgeordneten Mechthid Dyckmans, supra note 173. 
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rat through a mandatory two-year “cooling off” period before 
the former member of the Vorstand can join the Aufsichtsrat.189 
The shareholders are also given a non-binding say-on-pay vote 
with respect to the Vorstand’s earnings, though at the compa-
ny’s discretion. 
2. Initial Reaction 
Though the initial reactions to the VorstAG were varied, they 
tended to be blasé or negative, albeit not necessarily overtly. It 
was cynically noted that the entire law went from proposal to 
fait accompli with unusual speed, pressed through before the 
onset of the summer break while politicians were still out get-
ting votes for reelection.190 These commentators implied it was 
all a political stunt with no bite, and some seemed animated by 
a feeling of a missed opportunity to achieve true reform. Others 
felt the entire exercise was misguided. One commentator noted 
that focusing on a multi-year performance measurement period 
did nothing to hinder the spiraling executive bonuses that con-
tribute to the destabilization of management pay.191 Another 
attorney practicing in the field in Düsseldorf was surprised 
that the VorstAG did not include changes to a company’s abil-
ity to fire its executives, noting that this threat was far more 
effective in obtaining good behavior than clawbacks or extend-
ing performance review over multiple years.192 The law in-
                                                                                                             
 189. Prior to the passage of the VorstAG, this kind of shift was fairly com-
mon, the argument being that the former member of the Vorstand was inti-
mately acquainted with the business and could provide helpful information in 
this regard. It is also helpful to remember that the Vorstand contains not 
only CEO- and CFO-type positions, but can contain the Chief Technology 
Officer or heads of important departments who could indeed offer advice from 
his or her very specific area. 
 190. See Joachim Jahn, Das VorstAG: Neue Vorschriften gegen “unangemes-
sene” Managerbezüge, GWR 283394 (2009); Jürgen van Kann & Anjela 
Keiluweit, Das neue Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung [The 
New Law on the Appropriateness of Board Members’ Fees], 31 DEUTSCHES 
STEUERRECHT [DSTR] 1587, 1587 (Ger.) (2009). 
 191. See Hermann J. Stern, One Page Commentary on the Unrecognized 
Core Problem with Executive Pay Today, (June 12, 2010) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1624223; 
Pressemitteilungen, Fachnews, Anhörung: Experten im Rechtausschuss 
streiten über Neurgelung der Managervergütung, BECKLINK 282389. 
 192. Hans-Hermann Aldenhoff, Abschaffung des Kündigungsschutzes für 
Spitzdenverdiener, NZA 800 (2010). 
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cludes no salary cap, as pointed out by the Green Party during 
the proposal period, which in its view is a major flaw.193 Law-
yers early on bemoaned a lack of precision—with key concepts, 
like “sustainable compensation,” left undefined—making com-
pliance difficult and, perhaps, even dangerous.194 Others were 
less overtly negative, noting that many of the provisions al-
ready existed in the Corporate Governance Code and that the 
law therefore had little practical and certainly no revolutionary 
impact.195 
But the reactions were not all bad, not least because the gov-
ernment had in fact shown extraordinary responsiveness in 
acting quickly to try to do something about an issue that many 
thought needed to be addressed.196 In defending her govern-
ment’s law to the critics, Germany’s then-Minister of Justice, 
Brigitte Zypries, went on the offensive, insisting that far from 
being hastily cobbled together, the VorstAG had been drafted 
by calm minds intent on doing what made sense rather than 
caving to populist demands.197 The powers awarded to the 
Aufsichtsrat were championed because, in the spirit of the 
Code, they provided structure without limiting the flexibility 
necessary to run a successful business, and the Aufsichtsrat 
now had a greater arsenal of tools with which to combat a 
rogue Vorstand.198 The law also resolved a key ambiguity. In 
the Mannesmann era, the Aktiengesetz required only that com-
pensation be reasonable, without defining what was reasona-
ble. Under the VorstAG, however, the concept of reasonable 
became more concrete, specifying that reasonable was to be de-
                                                                                                             
 193. Antrag der Abgeordneten Chrintine Scheel, supra note 173. 
 194. Stellungnahme des Deutschen Anwaltvereins durch den Han-
delsrechtsausschuss zum Entworf eines Gesetzes zur Angemessentheit der 
Vorstansvergütung (VorstAG), Stellungnahme nr. 32/2009, Apr. 2009, 
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 195. See, e.g., Kahn & Keiluweit, supra note 190, at 1587. 
 196. Jahn, supra note 190; Marcus Lutter, Stellungnahme im Rahme der 
VorstAG, May 20, 2009, http://www.jura.uni-
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Aufsichtsrat, 32 WM 1489 (2009). 
 197. Siebert, supra note 196. 
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fined on a peer group basis and then further defining how that 
peer group basis should be set.199 The say-on-pay advisory vote 
also had a positive reception.200 In place in England since 2002, 
say-on-pay had been shown to have a positive, if not game-
changing, effect on executive compensation, punishing and 
therefore ultimately minimizing so-called “pay for failure,” like 
the kind highlighted by Disney in the United States.201 
These were only the initial reactions, however, and by the 
next year, the press and the government were focused on the 
next corporate governance issue du jour, which was increasing 
the percentage of women sitting on the male-dominated 
Aufsichtsrats and Vorstands.202 The executive compensation 
issue had relatively quickly disappeared from the headlines, 
but the question remaining is, why? Had the corporations 
learned? Had they changed? To assess this question, it is useful 
to examine the primary material itself: the compensation dis-
closures made by the DAX 30, primarily in their annual re-
ports. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Methodology 
For an outsider, there is no better source of information for 
executive compensation than a company’s annual report.203 
Each annual report contains a section that describes the com-
                                                                                                             
 199. Jahn, supra note 190. 
 200. Gunther Friedl et al., DSW-Studie zur Vorstandsvergütung 2009, 
DSW, http://www.dsw-info.de/DSW-Studie-zur-Vorstandsvergue.1576.0.html 
(last visited Feb. 11, 2013). 
 201. See Ferre & Maber, supra note 82, at 1–4. 
 202. See Katrin Bennhold, Women Nudged Out of German Workforce, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 28, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/29/world/europe/29iht-
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fremd”, DIE WELT (Nov. 13, 2011), 
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 203. While a company may also issue press releases in response to compen-
sation developments, that kind of disclosure remains rare in Germany. Of the 
DAX 30 companies, for example, only a few issued a press release in connec-
tion with the VorstAG, which itself only served as a preview of coming attrac-
tions of sorts. 
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pany’s general executive compensation policy as well as the 
remuneration of the top executives.204 In the United States, 
this section is referred to the CD&A, a term this Article will 
use as shorthand to refer to both German and U.S. compensa-
tion disclosures. The CD&A not only reveals hard facts about 
who was paid how much in a given year, but also offers an in-
sight into how a company handles the very tricky issue of re-
vealing just how much it paid its top officers. Disclosures vary, 
of course. Some are helpful, with charts and clearly laid out 
principles that allow the average stockholder to form a picture 
of how exactly the company comes up with the sums its execu-
tives walk away with, while others present only a cursory ex-
planation. Some group the information about compensation to-
gether, while others may force the reader to search through the 
various footnotes to piece together a compensation picture that 
is sketchy at best. Nevertheless, disclosures are generally help-
ful to ascertain changes over time. A company with the same 
cookie-cutter disclosure year after year might not be as con-
cerned with executive compensation as one that updates and 
refines its presentation over time. The development of a com-
pany’s CD&A over time also shows how it reacts to a new law 
or requirement. This is especially true for the VorstAG—what 
better way to show good faith and compliance with an issue of 
great importance to shareholders than to lay related compli-
ance mechanisms bare in the annual report? 
To properly assess the impact of the VorstAG, it is illuminat-
ing to examine annual reports from 2008, 2009, and 2010. Be-
cause there were no other executive compensation-related rules 
passed during this time, it is fair to assume that any changes 
made to the CD&A were the result of the VorstAG require-
ments or the indirect result of companies having their compen-
sation reports come under new scrutiny. The 2008 reports 
should serve as a control group for pre-VorstAG compensation 
                                                                                                             
 204. In the United States, this requirement stems from the SEC’s CD&A 
requirements, which many law firms lay out very helpfully for their clients in 
order to enable them to comply. See, e.g., Memorandum, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, 
Wharton & Garrison LLP, SEC Adopts Changes to Compensation Disclosure 
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fenlgung der Vorstandsvergütung, NZG 945 (2005). 
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structure and disclosure; the 2009 reports should chronicle the 
beginnings of the implementation of various VorstAG provi-
sions; and the 2010 reports should reflect a complete picture of 
compensation strategy following the full effectiveness of the 
VorstAG. In particular, the analysis in this Article is centered 
on the reports of the DAX 30, the premier stock index in Ger-
many composed of blue chip companies traded on the Frankfurt 
stock exchange, including the likes of Deutsche Bank, Siemens, 
BMW, and Lufthansa.205 Since, as public companies, the DAX 
30 were all affected by the VorstAG, this group includes the 
companies that were most visible and thus had the most to lose 
by not complying with the VorstAG. 
I reviewed these annual reports on two levels: qualitative and 
quantitative. On the qualitative level, my goal was to deter-
mine whether the VorstAG had caused a shift in the compa-
nies’ executive compensation strategies or the manner in which 
they were disclosed. With regard to strategies, as further de-
scribed below, I assessed the extent to which the annual re-
ports discussed the VorstAG itself and whether they had in-
cluded VorstAG concepts in the CD&A. If they had been in-
cluded, was it purely on a cosmetic level, adding a few 
buzzwords here and there, or had companies seriously re-
vamped their compensation systems to try to comply with the 
new law? With regard to the manner of disclosure, I looked to 
benchmarks like how long the CD&A section became and 
whether descriptions became clearer or the section differently 
organized. On the quantitative level, I looked at how Vorstand 
compensation was apportioned. In other words, what percent-
age of compensation was paid out as base salary, as bonus, etc., 
and how did those percentages change from year to year? I cal-
culated the percentages by dividing the amount paid to the en-
tire Vorstand in any given category—such as salary, benefits, 
or long-term incentive compensation—by the total compensa-
tion they were all paid. In the few cases where the company did 
not provide an overall compensation amount, I totaled the 
numbers from the various categories to arrive at this 
                                                                                                             
 205. As of March 2011, the full DAX 30 consisted of the following compa-
nies: Adidas, Allianz, BASF, Bayer, Beiersdorf, BMW Commerzbank, Daim-
ler, Deutsche Bank, Deutsche Börse, Deutsche Post, Deutsche Telekom, 
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amount.206 I tried to remain as true as possible to the categori-
zations chosen by the company, which tended to fall into the 
following: salary, benefits (together with salary, “fixed compen-
sation”), bonus or short-term incentive pay, long-term incentive 
pay, and occasionally medium-term incentive pay. I did not 
question any individual company’s assignation of values, nor 
did I try to evaluate whether programs were correctly labeled 
as long-, medium-, or short-term. I also tried to control poten-
tial distortions, omitting cases of non-reporting from my aver-
ages. I did, however, include compensation numbers where a 
company decided not to make a certain payment or executives 
decided to forgo it in a particular year, because this is as much 
a part of compensation strategy as making a payment. In short, 
I tried to put myself in the place of the informed shareholder 
looking to cast my vote on remuneration at any one of these 
given companies. Several questions were key: In what direction 
was the remuneration going? Were there any perceptible direct 
changes that resulted from the VorstAG? Would the reader of 
the annual reports be sufficiently or at least better informed as 
a result of the changes? 
B. Substantive (Qualitative) Changes 
The 2010 compensation discussion sections were very differ-
ent from their 2008 predecessors, with disclosure that was both 
better than and different from the typical level in 2008. What is 
especially interesting about the VorstAG is that its provisions 
contain both very precise requirements—for example, requiring 
a deductible for D&O insurance policies—as well as more gen-
eral requirements—for example, that compensation policies be 
“sustainable.” Thus companies had to show in their disclosure 
sections that they were complying not only with specific rules, 
but also with more general principles. 
Companies were clearly eager to show they had complied 
with the letter of the law by including specific references to the 
VorstAG. Over 70%207 of the companies in either or both of 
                                                                                                             
 206. The companies and years in question were Deutsche Bank in 2007 and 
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their 2009 and 2010 compensation discussions included a dis-
cussion of the VorstAG, including Allianz, BASF, and Daimler, 
which each issued a specific, separate press release acknowl-
edging the VorstAG and the compensation structure decisions 
being made with respect to it. Over 70% of the companies ex-
plicitly framed their compensation in “sustainable” terms or 
described the spirit of their compensation structure in words 
that, if not directly lifted from the VorstAG itself, very clearly 
reflected the philosophy of the new law, emphasizing sustaina-
bility and appropriateness. Companies in the former category 
included Metro and RWE, which respectively noted in 2009, for 
the first time, that “[t]he remuneration structure is geared to-
wards sustainable corporate growth,”208 and “the compensation 
structure will be brought more in line with sustainable busi-
ness development.”209 Those whose disclosures reflected the 
spirit of the VorstAG tended to include statements, such as 
that made by Deutsche Post, that the “remuneration of the 
Board of Management for 2009 is in line with standard market 
practice, appropriate to the tasks involved and designed to re-
ward performance; it comprises fixed and variable elements as 
well as long-term incentives,”210 or otherwise made clear that 
the company was calculating risk in order to create a compen-
sation package that was appropriate and rewarded (only) good 
business results.211 
90 percent of the DAX 30 companies thoroughly reexamined 
and, in many cases, completely overhauled their compensation 
schemes, according to their annual reports. Of this 90%, 85% 
stated that their re-evaluation came as a direct result of the 
VorstAG (including, among others, Commerzbank, BMW, E.ON 
and HeidelbergCement). Given the lack of other executive com-
pensation regulations during this time, it is safe to assume that 
even those companies who did not explicitly mention the 
VorstAG as the driving force behind their compensation re-
structuring were reacting to the VorstAG as well. A significant 
portion of the companies—over 36%—indicated that they hired 
a compensation consultant to review their pay structures and 
ensure they complied with the new law. More impressive, how-
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ever, is the growth of this figure. While only one company men-
tioned having engaged a compensation consultant in 2008, 
eleven companies indicated in 2010 that they had hired a com-
pensation consultant. This is an interesting contrast with the 
number of companies that mentioned the use of vertical and 
horizontal peer grouping,212 directly or indirectly, which went 
up much less—up to twenty-two companies in 2010 from six-
teen in 2008, an increase of less than 40%.213 Interestingly, 
firms generally did not explicitly state in their CD&A whether 
they implemented a new D&O deductible payment policy. In-
stead their compliance or lack thereof was indicated through a 
different section, that of the degree to which they complied 
with the Code. Some changes, on the other hand, were almost 
universal. Before the VorstAG, nearly all of the companies had 
compensation committees that made all decisions regarding 
compensation. After the VorstAG, these committees continued 
but only in an advisory role. 
While new compensation disclosures indeed reflected the spe-
cific requirements set forth in the VorstAG, it is far more inter-
esting to see how they reflected the general principles, which, it 
turns out, clearly heightened the quality of the disclosure.214 
The disclosures were clearer and more descriptive, enabling the 
intelligent reader to form an idea of how the companies’ com-
pensation setting and payment processes work, including what 
components are considered, and how and why the compensa-
tion packages are structured as they are. 
This increase in disclosure is reflected in the increase in page 
numbers, beginning in 2009. For instance, SAP increased the 
                                                                                                             
 212. Horizontal peer grouping compares salaries of executives at a particu-
lar company to those at a company deemed similar in terms of size and in-
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nally at different levels of the company, comparing the amount earned by 
management, for example, to the amount earned by managers. 
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opaque and is of little use to the average investor, the target audience of 
these disclosures. 
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compensation-related section of its disclosure from sixteen pag-
es in 2008, to eighteen in 2009, to twenty in 2010;215 Munich Re 
from nine in 2008, to seventeen in 2009 and 2010;216 and 
Deutsche Börse from seven in 2008, to ten in 2009, to twelve in 
2010.217 That this increase in page numbers is due to the gen-
eral requirements of the VorstAG and not the actual descrip-
tion of VorstAG-related programs is indicated by the fact that 
already in 2009, before many companies had implemented spe-
cific policies targeted to respond to the VorstAG, many compa-
nies surveyed had longer compensation disclosure sections to 
try to provide more insight into their existing programs and 
comply with the spirit of transparency of the VorstAG. Over 
75% of the companies had increased the length of their com-
pensation report by 2010 as compared with 2008. 
Compensation discussions were also easier to find. Of the 
companies that had split up their compensation information, 
relegating the actual amounts paid to the footnotes, 50% opted 
to form a more cohesive section, moving their compensation 
numbers into the same section as their compensation philoso-
phy description. Deutsche Bank even went so far as to create a 
separate compensation booklet to give the shareholder a better 
understanding of their structures, obviating the need to go to 
the trouble of pinning down the information in the annual re-
port.218 In addition, the two companies that prior to the Vorst 
AG had refused to disclose certain compensation information, 
changed their decisions to withhold that information in 2010. 
As discussed in detail below, only one company, Heidel-
bergCement had voted not to describe its compensation philos-
ophy or reveal anything beyond aggregate numbers. In 2010, 
however, HeidelbergCement’s annual report included a com-
pensation disclosure section whose detail and length made 
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ungen an die Vergütungssysteme von Instituten und Versicherungsunterneh-
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clear that they had no intent to hide the ball. The other compa-
ny, Merck, had refused to disclose nearly all compensation in-
formation, stating that its corporate structure necessitated that 
such information could be disclosed only by the company’s gen-
eral partner. Like HeidelbergCement, though, Merck changed 
its tune in 2010, publishing information that it had hitherto 
deemed unnecessary to disclose in its annual report. Further-
more, companies became more forward-looking in their disclo-
sures, offering a preview of coming attractions in compensation 
changes. In 2008, 7% had this feature, compared with 63% in 
2009, and back down slightly, though still up overall, to 43% in 
2010. 
Not only did compensation disclosures increase in their num-
ber of pages and become easier to find, but the descriptions also 
changed from year to year in a way that indicated that compa-
nies were rethinking their compensation structures, or at the 
very least, rethinking the disclosure of their compensation 
structures, by avoiding boilerplate copies of the same infor-
mation. Indeed over 40% added more graphics and 66% added 
additional sections. The one section that showed a clear ten-
dency to remain exactly the same year after year was the sev-
erance section. 60 percent of companies kept their severance 
sections essentially or exactly the same, with their usual boil-
erplate language (sometimes featuring superficial alterations), 
and in general this language was far less informative than the 
remainder of the compensation disclosure section. This may 
reflect the fact that, of all the portions of compensation disclo-
sure, severance was the least affected by the VorstAG in the 
time period examined, as the VorstAG did not apply to existing 
compensation contracts, but only to those entered into after the 
law became effective.219 Nevertheless, it is interesting to note 
that sixteen companies—over half of the DAX 30—indicated 
they had begun to amend existing agreements, in whole or in 
part, to comply with the provisions of the VorstAG or the new 
compensation system developed under the VorstAG, despite 
the “out” the law had given them. At Deutsche Telekom, where 
the option to update was voluntary, seven out of nine execu-
tives agreed to have their contracts amended. Since this 
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amendment generally cannot be done unilaterally and requires 
the consent of the executive in question, it makes sense that 
most of the companies that amended their executives’ existing 
contracts also showed improvement in their disclosures, be it a 
marked improvement like RWE’s, or even a modest improve-
ment to an already highly informative disclosure regime, like 
Siemens’. Companies also implemented clawbacks in their per-
formance payments. Many had classical clawbacks for poor be-
havior, although there was an increasing number of perfor-
mance-based clawbacks, under which payments were to be 
awarded only in the event that certain benchmarks going for-
ward were reached. 
The biggest qualitative change in the DAX 30’s compensation 
disclosures, however, was the quality and the scale of their 
elaboration. 77 percent of companies more completely disclosed 
performance related practices, and 67% discussed percentage 
targets necessary to earn certain amounts of money. Indeed, in 
their 2010 disclosures, an astounding 86% of companies elabo-
rated more fully how their compensation structures functioned 
in real time. 
The best example to show the depth and breadth of the com-
pensation changes is to look at how one particular company, 
HeidelbergCement, changed its compensation disclosure from 
2008 to 2010. HeidelbergCement perhaps showed the greatest 
improvement in its compensation disclosure following the im-
plementation of the VorstAG. In sum, whereas in 2008, Heidel-
bergCement provided only a few pro forma paragraphs that 
were, truthfully, of little interest or help to the average share-
holder, in 2010, it not only described its new compensation 
structure in great detail, but it also did so in a way that was 
helpful and readily accessible to the average shareholder. 
In 2008, HeidelbergCement’s annual report was one of the 
worst among the DAX 30, for both its paucity of information 
and highly superficial discussion of remuneration. It devotes 
less than a page to Vorstand remuneration, of which half de-
scribed the compensation strategy in very generalized terms. 
The variable component of compensation, for example, was de-
scribed as “depend[ing] on the achievement of specific financial 
goals set by the Personnel Committee of the Supervisory Board 
at the beginning of the financial year (target net profit).”220 The 
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company announced aggregate compensation numbers for the 
Vorstand in paragraph form, far more difficult to read than in 
chart form, and stated merely amounts paid for fixed and vari-
able remuneration and perks. Since it did not disclose amounts 
paid as bonus, nor provide any further detail on payment struc-
ture to determine, for example, which sum included the bonus, 
the numbers had little to no value. The 2008 report also noted 
that “the 2006 Annual General Meeting exercised their right to 
exempt the Company from the obligation to publish the remu-
neration of each individual member of the Managing Board,” 
without even giving a basis for why they had decided to seek 
shareholder approval to avoid this disclosure, as required un-
der the VorstOG.221 In short, the annual report gave the aver-
age shareholder virtually no concept of how compensation was 
actually earned or the benchmarks upon which it depended, let 
alone the actual amounts individuals were earning. 
The 2009 annual report began to show signs of improvement. 
Remuneration was detailed in a “remuneration report” just 
over a page long, and compensation was described as not only 
taking into account compensation at peer companies deemed 
comparable via the peer grouping process, but also set with an 
eye to internal company pay structure, thus making horizontal 
as well as vertical comparisons.222 The company also added a 
sentence, clearly influenced by the VorstAG, to emphasize that 
“[t]he remuneration structure is fundamentally already geared, 
and independent of future developments, towards the sustain-
able development of the Group.”223 While not brimming with 
detail, HeidelbergCement’s 2009 annual report marked a clear 
effort to better describe the various portions of the company’s 
compensation package. For example, shareholders learned for 
the first time that the company paid two types of bonuses. The 
first, a regular variable bonus, “depends on the achievement of 
specific financial goals set by the plenary session of the Super-
visory Board [Aufsichtsrat] at the beginning of the financial 
year (Group share of profit after taxes and minorities).”224 
Thus, not only was the term “target net profit” from the 2008 
Annual Report further elaborated as “(Group share of profit 
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after taxes)”, but the new structure of decision-making man-
dated by the VorstAG was also reflected, with the Aufsichtsrat 
rather than an HR committee setting financial goals that need-
ed to be met for a payout to the Vorstand to occur. The second 
bonus was a medium-term bonus paid in 2009 and 2008.225 The 
2009 report further noted that additional compensation 
measures were being tied to the firm’s successful refinancing, 
i.e., to the ongoing health of the firm.226 This feature is a crowd-
pleaser because it aligns payments with VorstAG principles 
and shows shareholders that executives are not simply reward-
ed at the expense of the company, as the company will only 
make payments if financing is successful. 
While still in paragraph form and boasting no individual re-
muneration amounts, the section describing how much com-
pensation the company paid also improved. Instead of merely 
listing the amounts paid out in 2009 and 2008, the report de-
scribes whether they rose or sank and why. There was also a 
paragraph indicating that “[i]t is intended to review the remu-
neration system for the members of the Managing Board [the 
Vorstand] in the second half of 2010, especially regarding 
changes to regulatory provisions, and to develop it further if 
necessary. Experiences of other German companies with mul-
tinational exposure will be taken into consideration.”227 Though 
the company does not credit the VorstAG by name for the re-
view, the motivation is clear. 
It is in 2010, however, that a sea change comes to Heidel-
bergCement’s compensation disclosure; indeed, the section is 
unrecognizable. The 2010 remuneration report was elevated to 
the status of a proper section and ran nine pages long.228 Re-
muneration of the Managing Board, which used to be the only 
subsection, was further subdivided into 2010 versus 2011 re-
muneration.229 Though the 2010 remuneration section, in sub-
stance, is very similar to the 2009 section, its subdivision into 
“principles,” “remuneration elements,” and “amount of remu-
neration” allows the average shareholder to parse better the 
information he is receiving.230 The remuneration section for 
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2011 on, however, is not only better organized, but displays a 
remarkably high level of detail on compensation components 
and structures. The section begins with an entire subsection 
discussing how the company intends to implement the 
VorstAG, which includes the following: 
[H]igher weighting of variable remuneration compared with 
fixed remuneration, higher weighting of long-term bonus with 
a multi-year assessment base compared with the annual bo-
nus, linking of long-term bonus with the various key financial 
ratios as well as the relative development of the Heidel-
bergCement share compared with the DAX 30 Index and the 
MSCI World Construction Materials Index and the absolute 
development of the HeidelbergCement share; [and the] obliga-
tion for all members of the Managing Board to maintain a 
fixed number of HeidelbergCement shares as an individual 
investment.231 
This description—only a part of the 2010 report—is far more 
detailed than anything previously published by the company 
and demonstrates a clear commitment to the principles of the 
VorstAG. The company noted that the new system was devel-
oped in accordance with a renowned remuneration expert and 
that the compensation system “[was] geared even more than 
before towards the sustainable development of the Group,”232 
an impressive change from two years before, when there was 
no mention of sustainability whatsoever. The company then 
devoted four complete pages to outlining the components of its 
new compensation system (i.e., fixed annual salary, variable 
annual bonus, variable long-term bonus with long-term incen-
tive, fringe benefits, and pension promises).233 Further, the 
company provided a graph showing how the various compensa-
tion components stacked up against one another and a pie 
chart showing the proportion of fixed to variable compensation. 
It also described the contents of the pie charts in words, giving 
the average shareholder multiple ways in which to visualize 
and understand which portion of compensation is paid out in 
what form.234 In addition, the company broke down each of the 
compensation components, showing exactly how each would be 
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calculated. The annual bonus, the disclosure explains, is a 
combination of the target value, key performance indicators 
(which in turn rely on both company-wide and individual tar-
gets), and the target achievement range. A sample calculation 
was even provided to show how the tabulations play out.235 The 
company went through the same exercise for the long-term bo-
nus.236 Finally, the company decided to forego its shareholder-
granted privilege of disclosing only aggregate, as opposed to 
individual, compensation figures. HeidelbergCement made 
clear that individual disclosure was part of its new compensa-
tion system and even disclosed the individualized figures for 
2011.237 It also interestingly noted that the Supervisory Board 
“still ha[d]” the option to adjust the variable remuneration el-
ements by plus or minus 25% in accordance with “the personal 
performance of the individual members of the Managing Board 
and/or for exceptional circumstances.”238 Although it is unclear 
from this wording whether this was a power the Supervisory 
Board had always wielded, the answer is to some degree irrele-
vant for the shareholder who never even knew it existed until 
after the VorstAG. 
Not all compensation reports changed as much as Heidel-
bergCement’s in the wake of the VorstAG, but then again, most 
of them started out with slightly better disclosure in the first 
place. Regardless, the elements of change evident in the annual 
reports of HeidelbergCement from 2008 to 2010 were present 
in other DAX 30 reports from the same time period. The re-
ports reveal a new, clear standard and a new, clear winner: the 
shareholder, who is now in a far better position to make a 
judgment as to the health of the compensation practice—and, 
arguably, the corporate governance culture itself—than he was 
in 2007. 
C. Quantitative Changes 
While many quantitative changes in compensation were evi-
dent from the annual reports examined, in many ways it was 
simply too early to discern their significance. Given the market 
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fluctuations since 2007,239 stock-based compensation that com-
panies had originally designed to award might have turned out 
to have a great deal less value by year’s end. In addition, in 
light of the financial crisis, executives at certain companies, 
particularly banks, agreed to forego portions of their compensa-
tion packages, such as bonuses or other variable compensa-
tion.240 Lastly, the numbers alone could not tell the whole 
truth, as the payout of some of the awarded compensation dis-
closed might have been contingent upon future performance 
and subject to being clawed back. This would mean that certain 
variable pay components might appear higher than they were 
in reality. 
Despite the above disclaimers, certain trends seemed to 
emerge that are worth mentioning. As with the qualitative 
changes, there was a tendency to disclose more information. 
For example, HeidelbergCement, as discussed above, had pre-
viously taken a vote allowing it to bypass the VorstAG’s re-
quirement to disclose board members’ compensation, but chose 
to forego this privilege going forward; Volkswagen, for the first 
time, in 2009, explicitly identified its “variable” payment as a 
short-term bonus payment;241 and Merck, also as previously 
mentioned, disclosed the individual earnings of its executives 
in 2010 rather than using a technicality allowing them to be 
disclosed in a separate report as they had in both 2008 and 
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2009.242 Furthermore, adding a medium-term compensation 
component seemed to be increasingly appealing in the wake of 
the VorstAG. While in 2007 only three of the thirty DAX com-
panies included a medium-term variable compensation compo-
nent in their disclosures, the number more than doubled, total-
ing seven, in the 2010 reports.243 
Trends were also evident in the structural breakdown of ex-
ecutives’ compensation—that is, in the percentages of their to-
tal pay coming from bonuses versus base salaries, etc.244 Gen-
erally, the 2010 Vorstand received a greater proportion of its 
salary in the form of base salary and long-term variable pay, 
and a lesser proportion in bonuses and perks, than the 2007 
Vorstand.245 More specifically, base salary accounted for 24% of 
the Vorstand’s salary on average in 2007, 31% in 2008, 35% in 
2009, and 30% in 2010. The peak in 2009 might be due to the 
fact that the shares granted as variable compensation that year 
were subject to significant market volatility and were worth 
less than anticipated at the time the grants were determined. 
Despite the decreased value of the shares, the Aufsichtsrat was 
unwilling to compensate the executives by awarding more 
shares to make up the difference in value, thereby artificially 
inflating the salary to be a greater percentage of total compen-
sation. But even setting aside 2009, that companies reallocated 
7% of total pay to base salary in 2010 as compared with 2007 
remains a significant phenomenon. Total fixed income, on av-
erage, also rose significantly, from 28% in 2007 to 39% in 2009, 
although it declined to 32% in 2010.246 Long-term variable 
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compensation247 generally also rose steadily, from 26% in 2007 
and 2008, to 27% in 2009, and 29% in 2010. This means that 
long-term variable pay plus base salary now equal approxi-
mately 60% of the pay of a member of the Vorstand, up from 
just under 50% in 2007. These changes are perfectly in line 
with the VorstAG’s emphasis on sustainable pay. 
Perks, meanwhile, fell from their 2007 level of nearly 5% by 
about 2 percentage points, despite a sharp increase in 2008 to 
roughly 7%. This overall trend, however, is logical—perks are 
never popular with shareholders and can be particularly bad 
for the image of a company. The other percentage clearly on the 
decline was the bonus. While companies paid the Vorstand, on 
average, nearly 51% of their income as a bonus in 2007, it de-
clined to 47% in 2008, and 40% in 2009, before increasing again 
slightly to 43% in 2010. This overall decrease is in line with the 
VorstAG, which targeted a move away from short-term varia-
ble compensation—in other words, the bonus. The trajectory of 
bonus payments as a percentage of overall income should prove 
interesting and vital to future assessment of the VorstAG as a 
reform. 
One might argue that averages hide the picture, but a look at 
the numbers for individual companies confirms the trends 
identified above. Over half of the companies decreased their 
bonus percentages, but maintained or increased fixed salary 
percentages, in 2010 as compared with 2007. Similarly, over 
half of the companies that reported the information awarded a 
greater percentage of salary as long-term compensation. Still, 
there was a remarkable variety in the numbers, even within 
similar industries. In the auto industry, for example, BMW of-
fered no medium- or long-term variable compensation on the 
view that it was not helpful in motivating executives. Thus, 
BMW paid 20% of compensation as fixed salary in 2010 (com-
pared with 17% in 2007) and 80% in the form of a bonus (down 
from 82% in 2007). Daimler, on the other hand, while still 
awarding over half of income in the form of a bonus in 2010 (a 
figure up slightly from 2007’s 49%), had a robust long-term per-
formance program, which accounted for 29% of the Vorstand’s 
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income in 2010 (interestingly, down slightly from 2007’s figure 
of 31%). The comparison with Volkswagen was perhaps too ear-
ly to draw from these reports—it restructured its compensation 
in the period examined and also chose not to award bonuses in 
2007. Bearing that in mind, Volkswagen changed from a 38/62 
fixed income to performance income structure in 2007, to a 
30/70 fixed income to bonus structure in 2008 and 2009, to es-
sentially 20/50/30 fixed income to bonus to long-term incentive 
structure for 2010 and beyond. As these extreme differences 
highlight, even within market competitors, drawing significant 
conclusions from changes in percentages beyond that of general 
trends would seem premature. 
Given that the eternal complaint of executive compensation 
critics is that sums are too high, the pink elephant in the room 
is, of course, whether the VorstAG impacted the actual raw 
numbers paid out as salary. Again, the results were mixed. 
Overall pay rose by a maximum of 77% at Lufthansa and 
dropped by a maximum of nearly 60% at Commerzbank from 
2007 to 2010. For that same time period, of the twenty-five 
companies that reported salary information for both years, 40% 
saw an overall increase and 60% saw an overall decrease. Here 
the general economic situation is of little help: Germany re-
mained, for the most part, economically stable throughout this 
period.248 
IV. EVALUATION 
The VorstAG had lofty goals, but was it able to achieve what 
it set out to do? This section addresses that question on three 
fronts: first, by evaluating the changes in the annual reports 
against the law’s own goals; second, by checking whether peo-
ple’s predictions of the impact of the law proved to be accurate; 
and third, by asking whether the law brought about a new era 
in which executive compensation is both better structured, with 
an eye to the long term, and more transparent. 
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A. The VorstAG Measured Against Itself 
The goals of the VorstAG, broadly put, were three-fold: (1) to 
increase transparency, (2) to make compensation structure 
more sustainable, and (3) to emphasize the long-term view in 
structuring compensation. 
First, with regard to increasing executive compensation 
transparency, the VorstAG has more than reached its goals. As 
discussed in Part III above, the VorstAG has had a clear and 
significant impact. Not only are compensation discussions 
longer, they are clearer and offer a more in-depth description of 
how performance factors work, as well as how the ultimate 
payouts are calculated. Even companies that started out with 
relatively informative disclosure practices, like Siemens in 
2008, produced a 2010 report that was significantly clearer and 
explained in-depth what the new changes were, why the com-
pany had decided to make the changes, and what precisely it 
was about the changes that made the new system preferable, 
placing more of an emphasis on the long-term. K+S, whose 
2008 disclosure was already above average for its informative 
nature, updated its disclosure to provide a sample calculation 
of how compensation would be paid out under the new struc-
tures. Given that one of the problems with disclosure is that it 
tends to overwhelm the reader, breaking out a sample calcula-
tion allows the reader to visualize exactly what the descriptions 
and performance metrics mean in terms of the cash that the 
executive actually takes home. 
It is true that transparent disclosure is far from reigning su-
preme. Approximately 13% of the DAX 30 saw no increase in 
elaboration between 2008 and 2010. One company, Man, even 
had worse disclosure in its 2010 annual report than in 2008, 
providing a less complete picture of compensation and remov-
ing some compensation summaries in tabular form that had 
proven useful in years prior. But even some of the most reticent 
companies displayed signs of an awareness that they were liv-
ing in a world where new compensation disclosure norms were 
required. Merck, for example, after offering no disclosure in 
2008 or 2009 on the grounds that it could be done in a different 
company’s annual report, making it more difficult for share-
holders to find, included a limited amount of disclosure in 2010. 
Its amount of compensation disclosure, however, was less in-
teresting than the pains it took to justify the lack of disclosure. 
In its 2010 report, Merck went into far more detail than it did 
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in years prior to describe what precisely it was about its corpo-
rate structure that entitled the company to bypass the disclo-
sure rules required by the VorstOG before offering up limited 
compensation disclosure for the first time. It further went to 
great lengths to emphasize that all of the disclosure was volun-
tary.249 HeidelbergCement, on the other hand, after years of 
non-disclosure by virtue of a shareholder vote permitting that 
approach, simply threw in the towel, coming out in 2010 with 
some of the clearest and best disclosures in the DAX 30. Clear-
ly, the VorstAG imposed expectations of a new level of trans-
parency, and those who do not comply might worry about re-
prisals from the market, their shareholders, or both, if they fall 
below these new VorstAG-inspired norms. 
In the second category, sustainability,250 the review was more 
mixed, and more time is likely needed for a full assessment. 
From a substantive perspective, the focus on sustainability was 
clear. Almost 75% of the DAX 30 either referenced sustainabil-
ity as a new guiding principle for compensation in the wake of 
the VorstAG, or discussed their updated compensation plans in 
the sustainable terms that the VorstAG set out, or both.251 But 
the numbers do not necessarily support the idea that sustaina-
ble compensation structures are here to stay. The single largest 
piece of evidence for this concern is the continued prominence 
of the most vilified and unsustainable portion of compensa-
tion—the annual bonus. Based on achieving short-term incen-
tives in the year in question, the annual bonus, one could ar-
gue, does nothing to encourage sustainable growth, particularly 
when it forms such an important portion of the compensation 
package. 
And indeed, annual bonuses clearly still do constitute a major 
portion of executive compensation. In 2010, bonuses, for the 
companies that reported them (and not including those compa-
nies where executives chose to forego them), still accounted on 
average for 43% of compensation paid to the Vorstand. While 
                                                                                                             
 249. MERCK, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 242, at 111. 
 250. Sustainability here as elsewhere refers generally to the stakeholder 
concept. The company has to be run such that it continues to be a going con-
cern for the benefit of all those who have a stake in its operations, from em-
ployees to shareholders to business partners, rather than maximizing one 
aspect of the company at the expense of another. The details of how a com-
pensation plan is to be made “sustainable” is left to individual companies. 
 251. See supra notes 208–211 and accompanying text. 
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the figure was down from nearly 51% in 2007, it still accounted 
for the single largest factor in the Vorstand’s compensation 
packages.252 The bonus percentages for individual Vorstands do 
vary, of course: in 2010, five companies awarded less than 30% 
of total compensation as bonuses, eight awarded between 30% 
and 39%, six between 40% and 49%, six between 50% and 59%, 
three between 60% and 69%, and one over 70%. It is hard to 
see how a compensation structure meets the VorstAG’s goal of 
sustainability when it consists in such large part of annual bo-
nuses—for example, when the members of the Vorstand, such 
as that at Henkel, earns 69% of their income in bonus form, 6% 
as long-term performance variable compensation, and 25% as 
base salary. When any one person earns such a significant por-
tion of his or her pay as a reward for short-term decisions that 
look no further than the end of next quarter, it quickly becomes 
clear why and how these structures could have contributed to 
the financial crisis and remain a hindrance to sustainable 
growth. Thankfully, however, the picture once again is not so 
bleak. For every Henkel in the DAX 30, there are also compa-
nies like SAP, which have more than halved the percentage of 
compensation that gets paid as a bonus, down to 34% from 
about 71% in 2007. It is also interesting to note that there is no 
necessary correlation between companies that display spectac-
ularly improved disclosure that hews closely to the VorstAG’s 
principles and the percentage of compensation paid as a bonus. 
SAP, for example, while showing improved disclosure, came 
nowhere near the helpfulness of Deutsche Bank’s disclosure. 
However, companies that continued to pay a significant per-
centage out as a bonus often sharply increased the quality of 
their disclosure, perhaps seeking to justify this high proportion 
through the additional information. 
With respect to the VorstAG goal of fostering more attention 
in compensation structures to the longer term, again the re-
sults were mixed, in part because of changing compensation 
systems and in part because of stock market fluctuations. It is 
true that the portion of compensation paid out as long-term in-
centive pay is increasing, and the number of companies offering 
                                                                                                             
 252. I should note here that Commerzbank has not paid a bonus to its 
Vorstand since 2007. In 2008, neither Deutsche Bank nor Deutsche Post paid 
any bonus, and in 2009, Mann SE and ThyssenKrupp elected not to pay bo-
nuses. 
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medium-term compensation has doubled. However, so few 
companies were using medium-term compensation as part of 
their plans in 2007 that doubling this number still leads to a 
rather unimpressive figure—less than 25% of the DAX 30 were 
using medium-term compensation programs as of 2010. In ad-
dition, the bonus issues discussed above remain problematic. 
The amounts being paid out as long-term compensation for the 
most part pale in comparison to what is being paid out as bo-
nuses.253 
B. Evaluating Initial Reactions 
As discussed in Part II, many people made a variety of pre-
dictions about the VorstAG and its ultimate impact. On the one 
hand, those who reacted negatively believed the law would be 
more or less useless—they predicted that it would not have any 
kind of real impact nor would it stop executive compensation 
from spiraling increasingly out of control. On the other hand, 
those who saw the VorstAG positively believed that it would 
better allow the Aufsichtsrat to control the Vorstand. Two espe-
cially positive features were thought to be defining the peer 
group and adding say-on-pay to help lessen instances of “pay 
for failure,” those highly publicized incidents such as Disney, 
where disgraced executives receive monumental sums as they 
leave the company. 
The critics were at least partially wrong. As discussed in Part 
IV.A, the VorstAG did have a significant impact, both on com-
pensation disclosure and, as far as can be ascertained from the 
earlier description, on compensation structure as well. The in-
creased disclosure, the in-depth descriptions, the hiring of 
compensation consultants, and the inclusion of additional 
charts and graphs are all a result of the VorstAG, as are the 
reevaluations of compensation structure. As for the question of 
whether the VorstAG will provide any kind of pushback 
against the spiraling salaries that receive such significant me-
dia attention, the annual reports examined are inconclusive, 
                                                                                                             
 253. The significant exceptions are Commerzbank (paying no bonus), In-
fineon (paying significantly more as long-term compensation than as bonus), 
and Deutsche Bank and Fresnius (essentially paying an equal percentage of 
both long-term compensation and bonus). Here, the new compensation regu-
lations for financial institutions may be at play, revealing an even larger 
problem. 
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and it might be too early to tell. While some companies did see 
salary increases as compared with 2007, of the twenty-five 
DAX 30 that actually reported compensation in both 2007 and 
2010, 60% reported an overall decrease, by anywhere between 
4% and 60%. Again, the remaining salaries rose, and some very 
steeply, during this time—Lufthansa’s compensation increased 
the most drastically, by 77%. Causation is particularly tricky to 
infer with respect to salary amounts because there are so many 
other factors at play and the VorstAG does not deal openly with 
the question of salary in terms of a cap. But the VorstAG does 
require that compensation be appropriate with respect to the 
peer group and imposes liability on the Aufsichtsrat if compen-
sation is higher than appropriate relative to peer companies 
without sufficient justification. So while it is unclear whether 
we are seeing the effects of slightly more cautious Aufsichts-
rats, the correlation should be noted. 
Evaluating whether the champions of the VorstAG were right 
proves to be more difficult. For example, one of the key aspects 
of the VorstAG that advocates found so alluring was that it 
gave the Aufsichtsrat more control over a rogue Vorstand. Giv-
en that we are in the first few years of the VorstAG’s applica-
tion, combined with a political and economic climate that has 
produced the Occupy Wall Street movement fuelled by anger at 
bankers and other high-earning individuals, it would seem un-
likely that members of the Vorstand would be inclined to make 
outrageous compensation demands during this time. Short of 
misbehavior by the Vorstand, it is difficult to evaluate the de-
gree of Aufsichtsrat control over the Vorstand. But one can see 
some signs of the Aufsichtsrats preemptively flexing their mus-
cles: though the VorstAG only applies to employment contracts 
entered into after its effective date, members of a significant 
number of Vorstands have agreed to change their existing em-
ployment agreements to comply with the new VorstAG re-
quirements, even though they are not required to do so until 
the end of their contracts.254 Vorstands where some or all 
members have agreed to this change constitute a majority of 
the DAX 30, though barely, and include BASF, BMW, Munich 
                                                                                                             
 254. I note here that this will mainly affect base salary—usually awards 
from option compensation plans and the amount of bonus awarded is suffi-
ciently discretionary as laid out in the employment agreement that its pay-
ment would reflect the VorstAG. 
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RE, and ThyssenKrupps. In addition, more companies are of-
fering a preview of “coming attractions” of sorts in their com-
pensation disclosure, indicating where the company might tend 
toward in the future. This is perhaps a sign that the Aufsichts-
rat is taking more control of compensation strategy and devel-
opment or at least eager to show shareholders that they are 
taking the matter seriously, possibly even looking to test mar-
ket reactions to their tentative plans. The most significant, but 
not the only, examples of this were the previews and subse-
quent changes in light of the VorstAG itself. Linde, BASF, and 
Deutsche Börse were among the nineteen companies that 
started to discuss their VorstAG changes before fully imple-
menting them, or gave a glimpse into what they would be dis-
cussing the following year. This trend continues, and is an in-
teresting one. The idea that the Aufsichtsrat can be proactive 
with respect to compensation policy rather than simply reac-
tionary is very much within the spirit of the VorstAG. Another 
benefit championed by the supporters of the VorstAG was that 
defining a peer group could avoid a situation where outsized 
and disproportionate payments are made, as was the percep-
tion with the Mannesmann affair. Again, only time will tell, 
but in their disclosures more companies are emphasizing their 
horizontal and vertical comparison process per the VorstAG, as 
mentioned in Part III above. Interestingly, no companies chose 
to publish which other companies they used to establish their 
horizontal peer group in their CD&A section, as is done in the 
United States.255 
Proponents of the law were also excited about the inclusion of 
the say-on-pay, which has been shown to decrease instances of 
pay for failure in England.256 Whether it will have the same 
effect in Germany remains to be seen. However, despite its op-
tional nature, it is indeed being used by companies as a corpo-
rate governance tool and seems to be fully integrated into cor-
                                                                                                             
 255. Cisco’s 2009 annual proxy, for example, includes a list of their initial 
peer group, their then-current peer group, and an explanation of why there 
was a change in these peer groups over time. See CISCO, 2009 PROXY 
STATEMENT 50–52 (2009), available at 
https://materials.proxyvote.com/Approved/17275R/20090914/NPS_46091/HT
ML2/default.htm. 
 256. See German Companies Engage on Pay Ahead of First Say-on-Pay 
Votes, MANIFEST (Jan. 15, 2010, 5:02 PM), 
http://blog.manifest.co.uk/2010/01/2802.html. 
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porate governance best practice standards,257 with most DAX 
30 companies giving their shareholders an advisory say-on-pay 
vote in 2010.258 Several companies also reported this share-
holder approval in their 2010 annual reports, including K+S, 
RWE, ThyssenKrupp, and Volkswagen, by either noting the 
precise shareholder vote margin or indicating that the plans 
were approved by “a large majority,” or similar wording.259 It 
seems, too, that apprehension about the result of the vote has 
not necessarily prevented companies from allowing the vote to 
happen. In January 2010, both Siemens and ThyssenKrupp 
met with shareholders ahead of time to address pay concerns 
out of worry about the results of the vote.260 
C. A New Era? 
The final evaluative question is whether the VorstAG has 
changed the game. Has it ushered in a new standard? Do peo-
ple think about compensation differently? Based upon the an-
nual reports, the answer would be “yes,” albeit in a limited 
fashion. Executive compensation and disclosure appears to in-
volve a new strategy following the VorstAG, as evidenced by 
the new market standard in disclosure discussed above. Execu-
tive compensation strategies have been rethought and compen-
sation packages rearranged. Companies also seem to be em-
bracing the opportunity to positively affect their corporate gov-
ernance image. Siemens, for example, used the say-on-pay to 
help rebuild its image after its telecom bribery scandal that 
was settled in 2008,261 and HeidelbergCement went from non-
existent disclosure to one of the best in the DAX 30. In any 
case, it is clear that the German government no longer views 
                                                                                                             
 257. Friedl et al., supra note 200. 
 258. See Cleaning the Augean tables, THE ECONOMIST (June 23, 2011), 
http://www.economist.com/node/18867298. 
 259. K+S, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 3233 (2011); RWE, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 
143 (2011). ThyssenKrupp and Volkswagen even state the approving per-
centage, which is above 99% in both cases. THYSSENKRUPP, 2010 ANNUAL 
REPORT 67 (2011); VOLKSWAGEN, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 133 (2011). 
 260. See German Companies Engage on Pay Ahead of First Say-on-Pay 
Votes, supra note 256; Daniel Schäfer & Richard Milne, Siemens Awaits In-
vestor Vote on Executive Pay, FIN. TIMES UK (Jan. 26, 2010, 2:00 AM), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/90b9530e-0a19-11df-8b23-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz1eLVepcNi. 
 261. See David Gow, Record US Fine Ends Siemens Bribery Scandal, 
GUARDIAN, Dec. 16, 2008, at 24. 
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executive compensation as a top priority—the corporate gov-
ernance issue du jour beginning in the fall of 2010 was the 
matter of female representation on the Aufsichtsrat. In short, 
there is a new platform for executive compensation reform. 
How far the reform eventually reaches is something only 
time—or perhaps the next compensation scandal—will tell. 
V. APPLICABILITY 
A. Lessons for Germany 
It is important not only to assess the VorstAG on its own 
terms as a success or failure, but also to see what can be 
learned from the early VorstAG experience and implementa-
tion with respect to Germany’s future corporate governance ef-
forts. The modest success of the VorstAG to date would seem to 
endorse the German recommendation-plus approach to corpo-
rate governance: voluntary compliance with the Code provides 
a barometer, allowing the government to see which measures 
companies will comply with on their own while highlighting 
areas where government intervention may be needed. This 
trend, previously discussed in the context of the VorstOG 
above, continued with the VorstAG to some degree, for example 
with the requirement that responsible executives bear some of 
the cost themselves in the event that the company’s D&O lia-
bility insurance is triggered. Female representation on the 
Aufsichtsrat would seem to be the next portion of the Code that 
is set to be transformed into law due to poor levels of compli-
ance.262 The cries of impending doom at the thought of compen-
sation reform, evidenced for example in a letter from the coali-
tion of businessmen to Angela Merkel before enactment of the 
VorstAG have proven to be merely bluster;263 the German 
economy, up until the middle of 2012, weathered the financial 
crisis and Great Recession rather well as compared with other 
EU nations or the United States.264 In addition, Germany 
                                                                                                             
 262. Peter Wollmert et al., Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex—eine 
Bilanz, CFOWORLD.COM (July 28, 2011), http://www.cfoworld.de/deutscher-
corporate-governance-kodex-eine-bilanz?page=3. 
 263. See Manager Protestieren bei Merkel, supra note 23. 
 264. Even in the throes of the European Debt Crisis in Fall 2011, German 
unemployment fell and the country generated “surprisingly good retail data.” 
AFP, German Jobs, Retail Sales Offer Rare Eurozone Cheer, THE LOCAL (Nov. 
30, 2011), http://www.thelocal.de/money/20111130-39207.html. It has only 
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proved that speedily enacted regulation is not necessarily 
toothless. 
One might argue that Germany could, and indeed should, be 
more aggressive—that the regulations in the VorstAG do not go 
far enough, and that Germany missed an opportunity to go 
even further. But given the nature of the development of Ger-
man regulations to this point, such calls are unrealistic. Ger-
many has emphasized flexibility and transparency from the 
beginning with the development of the Code. Because of the 
various cultural and structural factors at play as discussed in 
Part II, this approach has been unproblematic and, in fact, ef-
fective. Germany’s approach is a hands-on hands-off one, which 
is to say that corporate governance is laissez faire until it is 
not. Perhaps the German corporate governance approach ulti-
mately works precisely because companies recognize that they 
in essence exist on the brink. They will always be given some 
flexibility to set their own corporate governance measures, but 
how much flexibility they will be given and for how long is, in 
reality, always an open question. Rather than wait and find 
out, the lesson from the VorstAG is that companies themselves 
can be proactive, with a result that both they and the govern-
ment can learn to love. 
B. Lessons for the United States 
The lessons for the United States from the implementation of 
the VorstAG are broader than those for Germany. This is in 
large part because the German compensation reform system 
seems to be working, though perhaps not as radically as some 
critics might like. There was a perceived problem, a regulation 
was enacted within a year, and within a short period of time it 
seems to have achieved moderate success. The United States, 
on the other hand, took over a year longer than Germany to 
pass an act containing executive compensation reforms and six 
months to begin the rulemaking process, which is far from 
complete. It would seem that a few lessons learned from Ger-
many’s experience might help change the parameters of the 
debate and ease the gridlock in the United States, opening up 
room to discuss some new approaches to this problem in the 
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country where, by most accounts, the problem is at its worst. 
Four points in particular are worth mentioning. 
1. Quick, Effective Reform is Possible 
One of the most remarkable things about the VorstAG was 
the speed with which it went from political topic to written law. 
As previously discussed, Chancellor Merkel mentioned the top-
ic in passing on a handful of occasions in the year before the 
bill became law, and the time between its initial proposal in 
March and passage by the Bundestag in June was a mere four 
months. During those four months, the ruling coalition took 
comments on the law from a variety of sources, including aca-
demics and political parties, and also made major reforms to 
the initial proposal.265 By contrast, the initial proposal that be-
came Dodd-Frank was announced by Obama in June 2009, took 
more than a year for the bill to become law, and was still far 
from being implemented in its entirety more than a year later. 
The VorstAG was in effect by the beginning of August 2009 and 
had already started to impact compensation structure and dis-
closure in 2009, as evidenced by press releases from Daimler on 
December 16, 2009, and BASF on November 10, 2009,266 as 
well as annual reports that had already started to preview up-
coming changes.267 As discussed in Parts III and IV, the law 
proved to be relatively effective, changing compensation disclo-
sure and largely meeting the goals it had set for itself. This is a 
major achievement, one which none of the U.S. compensation 
laws have, until now, equaled. U.S. executive compensation 
measures have, at worst, led to unintended and unfortunate 
consequences and tend to fall short of expectations. One could 
argue this is because executive compensation regulations are 
more advanced in the United States than in Germany—
Germany is only just now taking care of the basics of its corpo-
rate governance, while the United States is already at a stage 
of handling more complicated things. But this argument is 
complicated by the fact that the latest legislation in the United 
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 266. Press Release, BASF, BASF Implements Law on Executive Compensa-
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CEMENT, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 222, at 43–44; INFINEON, 2009 
ANNUAL REPORT 54 (2010). 
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States and Germany has an important feature in common, the 
say-on-pay. 
2. Control at the Board Level is Key 
Many of the rules in the VorstAG focused on ensuring that 
the Aufsichtsrat took its supervision powers seriously and on 
preventing or discouraging undue influence on it or potential 
collusion with it by the Vorstand. The VorstAG, contributing to 
the increased professionalization of the Aufsichtsrat, made the 
Aufsichtsrat more responsible by holding its members personal-
ly liable for excessive compensation. It gave the Aufsichtstrats 
increased guidelines to go by as to what was appropriate and 
what was inappropriate compensation and also provided them 
with the power to drastically reduce compensation in the event 
that the company suffered a severe economic setback. As a re-
sult, an Aufsichtsrat has to be more actively involved—the 
rules provide many oversight responsibilities without setting 
forth a one-size-fits-all regulation that allows the Aufsichtsrat 
to simply check boxes. The Aufsichtsrat is left to determine 
what exactly is appropriate and when, if ever, it should use its 
extraordinary power to claw payments back. The two-year 
break imposed on any member of the Vorstand who wishes to 
become a member of the Aufsichtsrat absent shareholder ap-
proval further reinforces the distance that should exist between 
the two organs on a theoretical level, while preserving or even 
heightening actual shareholder control via the vote. It is also 
worth noting that no DAX 30 company has dared to request 
such shareholder approval in the wake of the VorstAG. Again, 
this approach seems to have worked, yielding, if nothing else, a 
more active Aufsichtsrat that pays attention to compensation 
structure and disclosure and evaluates them in light of the 
VorstAG.268 
Naturally, Germany has a different corporate structure in 
place than does the United States. The U.S. one-board system 
means that, of necessity, inside and outside directors must be 
part of the same organ and approve the same items. This is not 
to say that some boundaries cannot be drawn between these 
two groups, as Dodd-Frank has begun trying to do. A profes-
sionalization of the Compensation Committee, for example, 
might be in order, similar to the changes in the requirements 
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for Audit Committees following Enron. For example, anyone 
who reads the Disney case is struck by the fact that Sidney Poi-
tier was a member of the compensation committee that ap-
proved those payments that shareholders took issue with.269 
Despite his talents as an actor, Mr. Poitier’s expertise on ap-
propriate levels of compensation for someone who is not even in 
his line of work seems insufficient on its face. There could also 
be additional measures imposed on all outside directors, such 
as liability for excessive compensation. This concept of liability 
for directors in some capacity is not new. Under SOX, CEOs 
and CFOs face personal liability for incorrect annual state-
ments.270 
3. Salary Caps are Not Necessary 
When people think of compensation reform, they often firmly 
believe a cap is necessary. After all, one of the best ways to 
curb spiraling salaries, a main complaint about executive com-
pensation, would seem to be to limit them. In reality, however, 
such caps prove difficult to structure and can have serious un-
intended consequences. Section 162(m) of the Tax Code, as dis-
cussed in Part I above, provides a vivid example: the cap be-
comes the new, government-sanctioned normal.271 Neverthe-
less, advocates of salary caps press on. It is worth noting that 
in both Germany and the United States, there were effective 
caps on executive salaries at the banks and insurance compa-
nies that tapped into government bailout funds.272 But these 
limits, at least in the United States, were highly unpopular 
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with the companies themselves, and many banks rushed to re-
pay their support if only to be allowed more freedom with their 
funds.273 Caps also have their restrictions. Given the general 
freedom of contract in the United States, the federal govern-
ment can only impose caps when it has a jurisdictional basis, 
which for the most part tends to be when a company is public 
and therefore subject to the Securities Act and the Exchange 
Act.274 Some have therefore argued that a cap would simply 
push highly paid executives out of the public system and into 
the private, thereby transferring the problem to an industry 
that is not regulated from a compensation perspective, at least 
so far as the federal government is concerned. 
One of the VorstAG’s most important, and indeed most prom-
ising, lessons is that regulation can be effective without a cap. 
As discussed above, only a minority of the DAX 30 Vorstands 
saw their compensation rise in the wake of the VorstAG. By 
restructuring salary, imposing vesting periods, and imposing 
more strictly monitored performance-based goals, one can truly 
tie pay with performance. Whether the restructurings de-
scribed in the annual reports will lead to long-term dividends 
has yet to be seen. The short-term message is clear, though: 
caps do not have to be a part of effective reform. 
4. A Comprehensive Approach Yields Unexpected Dividends 
Above all else, the VorstAG is animated by a philosophy of 
imposing sustainability on executive compensation practices, 
and this may indeed be its greatest contribution. The notion of 
sustainability was not born overnight. It has long been an ani-
mating principle of the Code and corporate governance in Ger-
many. Despite the lack of rulemaking processes that exist in 
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Germany, companies essentially have a fallback interpretation 
position, because the German government has made clear the 
kind of regulatory direction it expects companies to take via the 
approach they have taken to corporate governance implemen-
tation. The Vorstand and Aufsichtsrat are expected to run the 
company for all of the shareholders, employing a responsible 
and indeed sustainable management style. The VorstAG made 
it clear that compensation packages are an important part of 
this approach by focusing on sustainability and payment ap-
propriateness as key criteria. By laying out general require-
ments without defining them down to the letter, the German 
government simply provided guideposts on the spirit and 
transparency which was to animate companies’ compensation 
structures. How companies should put in place appropriate 
structures and how companies could best show they were in-
deed attempting to make their compensation sustainable and 
appropriate under the VorstAG was up to the companies them-
selves. Nearly all of the most interesting changes and develop-
ments came as a result of these guiding themes as companies 
tried to figure out what the VorstAG meant. Hence, some com-
panies included model calculations, others opted to expand 
their substantive descriptions, some revamped their compensa-
tion structures, and others undertook serious evaluations of 
their compensation and wound up staying essentially where 
they were when they began. Regardless, it is the thought pro-
cess involved in and the disclosure necessitated by compliance 
that is important. From the evidence, it would seem that the 
German government did not foresee just how much the 
VorstAG would change company disclosure of compensation—
the government simply asked companies for greater transpar-
ency, and significant substantive change was the ancillary re-
sult of companies grappling to conform with the spirit of the 
law. 
In the United States, an open-ended law like the VorstAG 
would be unlikely. Our administrative law procedures are dif-
ferent and arguably more cumbersome, resulting in volumes of 
regulations that define in precise detail the applicable re-
quirements.275 Had the VorstAG as such been passed in the 
United States, the SEC would likely have defined “appropriate” 
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and “sustainable” in a far more rigorous way than they were 
under the VorstAG. On the one hand, such definitions would 
insure uniformity and a minimum understanding of compliance 
from all parties.276 On the other hand, precisely defining every 
word removes space for innovation and the opportunity to let 
companies (and ultimately the market) decide what works well. 
This kind of open-ended reform is critical for triggering the 
self-reflection needed to determine how to best translate these 
general principles into practical measures. This kind of self-
reflection, in turn, is in and of itself vital. For if, as companies 
say, the one-size-fits-all solution is too constraining, then they 
are in the best situation to determine which solutions work 
best for them. Why not, then, put them in the driver’s seat as 
they request? The destination could be mandatory and clearly 
defined, but each company’s path slightly less prescribed. 
C. Lessons for an International Framework 
Despite the talk of international executive regulations at G20 
summits, with executive compensation being a thorny issue 
that defies intra-national agreement, cobbling together regula-
tion that the international community as a whole can support 
can at times seem like a pipe dream. If one country with, at the 
very least, a legal system and culture in common cannot agree 
on executive compensation reform, how are countries like those 
in the G20, with their differing legal systems, structures, and 
cultures, supposed to arrive at any sort of a consensus? How 
would one even begin such a discussion? 
Again, the German experience with the VorstAG is helpful to 
rebut the skeptics because it shows that a simple and relatively 
open-ended rule can go quite a long way. The VorstAG’s focus 
on sustainability and appropriateness, as discussed above, is 
one of its most important contributions, and also the one that 
could be most easily and successfully applied across interna-
tional boundaries. With sustainability already a buzzword in 
other contexts, it is a concept recognized the world over. Fur-
thermore, it is not particularly revolutionary—few if any corpo-
rate founders, no matter their nationality or cultural back-
ground, start companies expecting them to end like Enron. On 
the contrary, their company’s goal is to grow, thrive, and be-
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come established. Executive compensation is an expense like 
any other, and any good businessman knows that expenses 
must be worth their cost. Making executive compensation “sus-
tainable” captures precisely that balance: compensation should 
not bankrupt the company, but rather should be an incentive to 
grow the company in productive ways. “Sustainable” is also 
open-ended enough that it would allow for cultural flexibility 
and sensitivity. Adopting a resolution at a G20 annual meeting 
to urge public companies to implement sustainable compensa-
tion practices worldwide would therefore seem feasible. 
Some could argue that an emphasis on sustainability would 
sideline shareholder value and mean the death of the share-
holder’s importance. But as mentioned in Part I, it is in share-
holder-primacy cultures like the United States where, some 
argue, the most change is needed. In the United States, change 
is already underway, for while the shareholder remains the 
most important concern in the corporate model, the assump-
tions about the shareholder in question are changing. No long-
er are we prioritizing the man who is in for a quick dime, or the 
woman who is only interested in profits at the end of the quar-
ter. With the proliferation of 401(k) plans, in addition to pen-
sion fund holdings, the United States has become a nation of 
stockholders, dependent for their long-term wealth on the stock 
market. Most shareholders are not in the game for the quarter-
ly results qua quarterly results, but rather the overall perfor-
mance of their funds over time. This fact has been unofficially 
recognized in legislation—Dodd-Frank, among other legislative 
efforts, tries to force companies to take a long-term perspective. 
In the United States, shareholders, as the principals in the 
principal-agent relationship, will always remain central. What 
is changing in practice, though it remains unrecognized, is this 
shift in the identity of the shareholder and the time horizons of 
his investment. 
CONCLUSION 
Executive compensation and its reform has long been a thorn 
in the sides of politicians. It seems to be the eternal problem to 
which there is no solution: the fox is in the henhouse, and it is 
the government’s job, from the outside, to try to at least fore-
stall disaster and, at best, manage this tricky relationship. The 
Occupy Wall Street movement in the United States has been 
only the latest demonstration of dissatisfaction with compensa-
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tion structures, protesting against the richest 1% of Americans 
who benefit from them.277 It is interesting here to note that 
though the Occupy movement is global, its aims are not the 
same all across the world. Occupy Berlin, for example, has 
broader targets, protesting capitalism in general, but not com-
pensation in particular.278 There are certainly many reasons for 
this difference, but to understand them, we might do well to 
look not only to the compensation laws and structures in place, 
but also to the government responses. 
Here is where the chief difference lies. The German govern-
ment was highly responsive to an issue that was particularly 
important to voters in light of the Great Recession. Faced with 
public anger, it acted quickly to try to address the broader 
qualms about opaque and poorly structured executive compen-
sation. Critics will argue that the VorstAG did not definitively 
solve the problem, and though they are not wrong, they are 
missing the point. The important thing is that the German 
government actually tried to do something about the problem, 
unlike every other leading economic power at the time. Their 
reforms, though modest, have had some very tangible results, 
and the issue has now faded from importance in Germany—it 
rarely appears in newspapers, and Germany is tackling other 
corporate governance problems. 
The United States has been characterized throughout its his-
tory as the land of opportunity, the place where change and in-
novation drive businesses and, indeed, the national mindset. 
Part of the United States’ success in the twentieth century de-
rived from using this innovation to its advantage, from the as-
sembly line to the New Deal to the Berlin Airlift to Silicon Val-
ley. But in matters of executive compensation reform, and po-
litical reform generally, the United States these days seems 
less capable of the quick, decisive, and innovative action that 
gave birth to the VorstAG. To break the stalemate, the United 
States might do well to look across the Atlantic to the EU’s 
most reluctant superpower, and just try something, even if it 
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seems unambitious. The results might amount to more than 
expected. 
